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ABSTRACT
The policy of “immigration federalism” has justified granting 
state and local police officers greatly increased responsibilities for 
enforcing immigration laws. It is designed to amplify federal 
enforcement by drawing on the vast number of local police and their 
knowledge of local conditions. Now, however, over 300 local 
jurisdictions have adopted so-called “sanctuary policies” designed 
to resist attempts to co-opt their participation in immigration 
enforcement. In response, national legislators and the Trump 
Administration have proposed legislation to squelch local resistance 
by cutting federal funds to those localities. Such responses are, 
however, deeply misguided and fundamentally inconsistent with the 
very theory of federalism. The widespread resistance to immigration 
enforcement partnerships is a state- and local-inspired reaction to 
the serious, if unintended consequences of localized immigration 
policing. A true immigration federalist should view such local 
resistance not as mere opposition to be quashed, but as a “new 
immigration federalism”—a source of insight into the on-the-ground 
problems with current immigration policies.  
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INTRODUCTION
When Kathryn Steinle was murdered in San Francisco by an 
illegal immigrant subject to a federal immigration detainer, her death 
was blamed on the city’s so-called “sanctuary” policies.1 The 
sanctuary accusation refers to San Francisco’s ordinance limiting the 
city’s cooperation with federal detainers, which are the primary way 
immigration officials obtain control of illegal aliens in state or local 
custody. San Francisco is among over 300 state and local 
jurisdictions that have adopted “sanctuary” laws.2 Federal officials 
 1. The woman, Kathryn Michelle Steinle, was visiting a tourist attraction 
in the Embarcadero district when she was gunned down at 6:30 in the evening. She 
was taken by ambulance to San Francisco Hospital and died two hours later. See
Christina Littlefield, Sanctuary Cities: How Kathryn Steinle’s Death Intensified the 
Immigration Debate, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2015, 5:10 AM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
local/california/la-me-immigration-sanctuary-kathryn-steinle-20150723-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/CT4K-SACD]. Ironically, the city’s sanctuary law was not the cause 
of the release for the immigrant who murdered Ms. Steinle. See infra note 203. 
 2. Bryan Griffith & Jessica Vaughan, Sanctuary Cities Continue to Obstruct 
Enforcement, Threaten Public Safety, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUD. (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://cis.org/Sanctuary-Cities-Map [https://perma.cc/RS3K-D3A2]. Some sources 
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claim that such laws have only one purpose: to shelter illegal aliens 
from federal immigration enforcement. As one legislator framed it, 
San Francisco is a “utopian” city that is “more interested in 
providing a sanctuary for those criminals than they are in providing a 
sanctuary for their own law-abiding citizens.”3 More recent threats to 
cut federal funding to states and localities with sanctuary policies 
mirror this view. 
In fact, the term “sanctuary” is not an accurate description of 
this modern state resistance movement, which is quite different from 
its historical namesake. The concept of a “sanctuary city” has 
American historical roots in 1980s efforts by churches to hide and 
shelter immigrants from Central America who had fled their 
countries’ violent civil wars and entered the United States illegally 
across the Mexican border. The sanctuary movement was initiated by 
private citizens whose explicit goal was to thwart federal 
immigration enforcement and prevent the immigrants’ deportation.  
By contrast, modern sanctuary law is a principled legislative 
response by states and localities. It is designed not to obstruct 
immigration enforcement writ large but to address certain 
pathologies of a system in which local policing and immigration 
enforcement has become destructively intertwined. Just as some 
states have enacted their own immigration enforcement regimes or 
formed partnerships with federal enforcers, sanctuary jurisdictions 
have chosen to distance themselves from federal immigration 
enforcement in furtherance of important state interests involving 
their immigrant communities. As such, sanctuary laws are the last in 
a long line of federalist paradigms that have defined the relationship 
between states, localities, and federal immigration officials.  
suggest much higher estimates of state and local resistance. See, e.g., Christopher N. 
Lasch, Why Trump’s Anti-Immigration Bluster Won’t Stop ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ THE
CRIME REPORT (Oct. 25, 2016), http://thecrimereport.org/2016/10/25/why-trumps-anti-
immigration-bluster-wont-stop-sanctuary-cities [https://perma.cc/K8ZC-MNC6] 
(estimating that “some 350 jurisdictions had enacted policies limiting detainer 
compliance” by 2015); Josh Sanburn, How Mayors Across the U.S. Are Defying Donald 
Trump on Immigration, TIME (Nov. 21, 2016), http://time.com/4578847/sanctuary-city-
mayors-donald-trump-immigration [https://perma.cc/U3X3-57RP] (reporting that “Lena 
Graber, an attorney with the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, says more than 500 
counties and about 40 cities routinely reject detainer requests”). 
 3. Mary Ann Toman-Miller, House Passes Bill to Curb Funding for 
‘Sanctuary Cities’, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2015, 2:42 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/la-na-sanctuary-cities-hearing-20150723-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZZB3-
YPHB]. 
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State and local police have played a variety of roles in 
immigration regulation. Historically, the relationship between law 
enforcement and immigration enforcement was often informal and 
undefined. But in the 1990s, Congress created a number of 
opportunities for explicit partnerships, including the 287(g) program, 
which empowered specially trained state officials to enforce 
immigration law, and Secure Communities, which channeled 
fingerprint data from state and local arrestees to immigration 
authorities.4 Around the same time that the federal government was 
inviting state–federal collaborations, states began enacting legislation 
that empowered state and local police to engage in various forms of 
immigration enforcement. 
Scholars have devised the term “immigration federalism” or 
“immigration policing” to describe these various forms of frontline 
immigration enforcement by state and local officials. The confluence 
of policing and immigration enforcement is also part of a broader 
phenomenon that academics have called “crimmigration,” meaning 
the increasing convergence between immigration law and criminal 
law, two previously independent legal regimes.5
Many scholars and practitioners extol the virtues of 
immigration policing. The most obvious is that involving state and 
local officials acts as a “force multiplier” for immigration 
enforcement.6 While federal agencies employ approximately 18,000 
immigration and customs enforcement officers,7 there are nearly 
18,000 law enforcement agencies in the country employing over 
750,000 police personnel with general arrest powers.8
Moreover, these myriad state and local police officers have 
informational advantages over federal officials in ferreting out 
undocumented noncitizens. As they patrol the streets, enforce traffic 
 4. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000). 
 5. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating
Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1458, 1465 (2013); Juliet P. Stumpf, 
Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 
1708-10 (2011). 
 6. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent 
Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 
(2005).
 7. BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2008 1 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HCR-G684]. 
 8. BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CENSUS
OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008 1-2 (2011), http://bjs.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AXC-QRDH].  
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laws, answer emergency calls, and investigate crimes, they gain 
important information about the identity and location of individuals 
who might be in the country illegally.9 Stops and arrests for state and 
local crimes, which are typically accompanied by searches and 
questioning, are particularly effective sources of information of all 
sorts, including about immigration status.10 Indeed, under some 
circumstances state and local police tuned in to immigration 
violations might be the first line of defense for identifying illegal 
immigrants who pose a serious risk to public safety.11
Immigration policing also has powerful detractors, including 
many state and city officials, police leaders, and civil rights 
proponents. Critics argue that enlisting police in immigration 
enforcement undermines public safety by diverting attention toward 
finding illegal aliens (without regard to dangerousness) rather than 
fighting crime.12 They also charge that immigration policing leads to 
racial profiling and undermines the trust and cooperation of lawful 
immigrant communities.13 To the claim that immigration policing 
might ferret out terrorists, critics point out that illegal presence is not, 
by itself, a good proxy for criminality, let alone terrorism.14 Others 
object that immigration policing creates incentives for police to 
target minor traffic offenders and misdemeanants in order to funnel 
them into the federal immigration system.15
 9. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration 
Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285, 1337-40 (2012). 
 10. See Barbara E. Armacost, Arizona v Gant: Does it Matter?, 2010 SUP.
CT. REV. 275, 293; Cox & Posner, supra note 9, at 1338-39; Rachel Harmon, Why 
Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation,
67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 827 (2015); infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. 
 11. Four of the nineteen 9/11 terrorists were stopped by police officers 
within weeks before the attacks and were released without knowledge of then-
current civil immigration violations. See Kobach, supra note 6, at 183-84. 
 12. See, e.g., Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration 
Policymaking, 79 UMKC L. REV. 901 (2011). 
 13. See Carrie L. Arnold, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: 
State and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV.
113, 119-21 (2007); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of 
Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1104 (2004). 
 14. See Jacob I. Stowell et al., Addition by Subtraction?: A Longitudinal 
Analysis of the Impact of Deportation Efforts on Violent Crime, 47 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 909, 912-14 (2013).  
 15. See David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc 
Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 202 (2012). Crimmigration scholars 
argue that involving police officers adds to the pathologies of an increasingly 
criminalized immigration system. See, e.g., id. at 202-03. 
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It is precisely these pathologies that have led an increasing 
number of state and local jurisdictions to adopt so-called sanctuary 
policies: laws or ordinances that limit or reshape the way local law 
enforcement officials interact with federal immigration officers. 
Contrary to those who claim these laws represent simple 
intransigence by states and localities, I argue that they embody an 
alternative, and defensible, model of immigration federalism, and 
one that comports with serious concerns about the legality of 
immigration detainers.  
While scholars to date have used the term “immigration 
federalism” to encompass only state and local immigration 
enforcement, I use the term more capaciously, to include state and 
local immigration resistance. Immigration policing regimes and 
sanctuary/resistance regimes represent differing views by states and 
localities about what arrangements best effectuate a productive 
relationship between authorities and their immigrant communities. 
They are both exemplars of federalism, broadly understood to 
encompass the myriad ways in which states and localities seek to 
share power with the federal government. For purposes of this 
Article, I call current sanctuary policies “the new immigration 
federalism,” to differentiate it both from the 1980s sanctuary 
movement and from the enforcement regimes to which the term 
immigration federalism has generally been applied.  
One aim of this Article is to demonstrate in real-world detail 
how the modern sanctuary/resistance movement is a practical 
critique of enforcement-oriented immigration federalism. Those who 
defend immigration policing argue that it will or will not have certain 
effects on the shape of policing and the shape of immigration 
enforcement, but they make these arguments at a macro level. Their 
claims cannot be evaluated unless we begin with a close-to-the-
ground understanding of ordinary police practices and then analyze 
how immigration enforcement impacts them. These issues remain 
under-theorized by the current literature. This Article seeks to fill 
that gap by viewing sanctuary policies as pragmatic responses to the 
negative consequences of immigration policing. It takes seriously 
that state and local officials are in a good position to offer insight 
into the real-world problems with current immigration policies. I 
argue that the new immigration federalism offers wisdom for 
harnessing the benefits of immigration policing while addressing its 
pathologies.  
This Article also contributes to crimmigration scholarship by 
focusing on two neglected areas. First, most of the crimmigration 
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literature has focused on substantive law, describing the ways in 
which immigration law has become “criminalized.”16 With the 
notable exception of a recent article by Ingrid Eagly, scholars have 
paid little attention to the ways immigration law intersects with 
criminal procedure.17 Second, crimmigration scholarship has been 
largely unidirectional: Scholars have addressed the criminalization of 
immigration law in great detail, but have paid much less attention to 
the effects of immigration on criminal justice.18 An article by David 
Sklansky has begun to engage this topic, describing how police 
officers have come to view immigration law and criminal law as 
tools to be used interchangeably against suspected criminal aliens. 
Sklansky calls this interchangeable use of legal regimes “ad hoc 
instrumentalism.”19
This Article adds to Eagly’s focus on crimmigration 
enforcement and Sklansky’s focus on instrumentalist policing in two 
ways. First, it links the instrumentalist features of immigration 
policing to an instrumentalism that is broadly pervasive in the 
policing context.20 Second, it applies lessons from the policing 
 16. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 15, at 162-63. For example, in recent 
years Congress has made more immigration offenses crimes and defined more 
criminal offenses as triggers for mandatory deportation. See id. at 164-81; Juliet P. 
Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration,
86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1588-89 (2008). Immigration officials increasingly use 
detention as punishment for immigration offenses and deportation as a tool of crime 
control. See Sklansky, supra note 15, at 202. Indeed, ICE now manages “the largest 
detention system in the country.” See id. at 183 (quoting DORA SCHRIRO, DEP’T
HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2009), http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8Q2-23CQ]). 
Immigration enforcement employs the largest body of armed federal law 
enforcement officials in the nation, and prosecutions for immigration offenses 
constitute the largest category of federal criminal prosecutions. Juliet Stumpf, The 
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
367, 388 (2006); Sklansky, supra note 15, at 158. 
 17. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of 
Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1126 (2013).
 18. Early scholarship on the 287(g) program made general claims about 
effects of immigration enforcement on policing, see, e.g., Greg K. Venbrux, 
Devolution or Evolution?: The Increasing Role of the State in Immigration Law 
Enforcement, 11 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 307 (2006), but recent 
scholarship has not returned to these themes. 
 19. Sklansky, supra note 15, at 201-02. 
 20. Police officers routinely use stops and arrests for minor offenses, such 
as traffic violations, to investigate crimes for which they lack probable cause. See 
infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. For articles providing a more general 
elaboration on this point, see supra note 10. 
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literature to provide an on-the-ground account of how criminal law 
and criminal procedure have become part of the broader 
instrumentalist universe of immigration enforcement tools.21
The rest of this Article is organized as follows: Part I briefly 
reviews the increasingly prominent role of state and local police in 
immigration enforcement, what has been called “immigration 
federalism.” It then describes the recent backlash by states and 
localities enacting policies that resist federal–state immigration 
partnerships. Multiple states have adopted statutes or ordinances that 
decline to honor U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
detainers or seriously limit the conditions under which they will 
honor them. Others have challenged the constitutionality of 
immigration detainers or declined to participate in Secure 
Communities or its successor, the Priority Enforcement Program 
(PEP). I call these policies the “new immigration federalism.”  
Part II disputes the claim that enlisting state and local police in 
direct immigration enforcement can “multiply” the nation’s ability to 
enforce immigration law without changing the shape of policing. 
This claim rests on the flawed assumption that policing decisions and 
immigration enforcement decisions will remain independent. In fact, 
police officers’ anticipation of downstream immigration enforcement 
affects their upstream law enforcement priorities. In particular, 
police officers have strong incentives to engage in so-called 
“pretextual policing,” using non-immigration stops and arrests 
(especially for traffic offenses and minor crimes) to funnel suspected 
illegal immigrants into the federal immigration system.  
These distortions of state and local law enforcement impose 
serious costs on communities. Pretextual policing compromises 
political accountability, making it more difficult to identify precisely 
which agency or level of government is responsible for the shape and 
priorities of immigration enforcement.22 Aggressive policing of 
minor offenders diverts resources away from crime control and 
undermines the trust and cooperation of immigrant communities, 
leading to an overall reduction in public safety.23 Immigration 
policing is also strongly correlated with racial profiling.24
 21. The analysis here is a theoretical complement to Eagly’s recent 
empirical project in which she studies the relationship between the criminal justice 
system and the immigration system in three urban localities. See Eagly, supra note 
17.
 22. See infra Section II.B. 
 23. See infra Section II.B. 
 24. See infra Section II.C. 
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Part III describes in more detail the range of new immigration 
federalism policies that states and localities have adopted.25 It takes 
issue with critics who claim that these so-called sanctuary laws arise 
from a militant desire to obstruct all enforcement against illegal 
immigrants. To the contrary, they are designed to counteract the 
unintended, negative consequences of immigration policing and to 
address valid concerns regarding the legality of federal immigration 
detainers. Part III gives an on-the-ground account of how the new 
immigration federalism addresses the specific pathologies resulting 
from pretexual policing described in Part II.26 That federal 
immigration authorities have begun to adjust their enforcement and 
detainer policies to address some of the objections raised by the new 
immigration federalism demonstrates that these policies contain 
important and constructive insights. By contrast, slapping the 
misnomer “sanctuary city” on new federalism jurisdictions and 
threatening to sanction them by cutting federal funds is deeply 
misguided and fundamentally inconsistent with the very theory of 
federalism. 
I. IMMIGRATION POLICING: FROM ENFORCEMENT TO RESISTANCE
In recent years there has been an explosion of scholarship about 
so-called “immigration policing.” All this attention might suggest 
that state and local immigration involvement is new or novel. In fact, 
it is not at all new. Both by federal design and by default, states and 
cities have always taken an active role in immigration matters. 
Despite the conventional wisdom that the “[p]ower to regulate 
immigration is unquestionably . . . a federal power,”27 the 
responsibility for the safety, security, and regulation of immigrant 
communities is widely shared by all levels of government.  
Historically, much of the federal, state, and local collaboration 
occurred informally and behind the scenes. This is no longer true for 
a number of reasons. In the 1990s, Congress passed several 
 25. See infra Section III.B. 
 26. See infra Section III.B. 
 27. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (emphasis added) 
(upholding a California statute that made it unlawful for an employer to knowingly 
employ an illegal alien). While federal exclusivity does not prohibit “every state 
enactment [that] in any way deals with aliens,” only the federal government can 
“regulat[e] . . . immigration, which is essentially a determination of who should or 
should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal 
entrant may remain.” Id. at 355 (emphasis added). 
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immigration bills that gave state and local officials targeted and 
publicly visible immigration enforcement power. Federal 
immigration officials also enacted programs like Secure 
Communities that created more overlap between ordinary crime 
fighting and immigration regulation. In addition, state legislatures 
began to enact immigration laws that sought to mirror or supplement 
the reach of federal immigration law.  
It may be that these programs represent a relative increase in 
the level of state and local immigration involvement. What is 
undoubtedly new is the extent to which immigration enforcement 
and ordinary policing have become intertwined. As a result, each has 
dramatically changed the shape and priorities of the other.  
The first wave of immigration federalism scholarship focused 
on the criminalization of federal immigration regulation, so-called 
“crimmigration.”28 To a lesser extent, it addressed distortions in the 
other direction, namely how immigration enforcement by police has 
changed the shape and priorities of policing, so-called “immigration 
policing.” What has received relatively less attention is that these 
changes have produced a backlash by states and localities responding 
in a new iteration of immigration federalism. In this Part, I provide a 
short history of immigration federalism and the shape of the backlash 
it has produced. 
A.  Immigration Policing in Federal Law 
State and local enforcement is part of federal immigration 
law’s design. This is particularly true over the past two decades. In 
each of two major reforms of this period, Congress created new roles 
and expanded existing roles for states and localities to enforce 
immigration law.29
 28. See, e.g., Stumpf, Crimmigration, supra note 16. 
 29. See APPLESEED, FORCING OUR BLUES INTO GRAY AREAS: LOCAL POLICE 
AND FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 17-18 (2008), http://cdm266901. 
cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/id/1603 [https://perma.cc/R4S7-WFQ5] 
[hereinafter FORCING OUR BLUES]. The dramatically increased participation of state 
and local law enforcement is an innovation of the 1990s. Prior to the 1996 
immigration reforms, there were only a few instances in which the heads of 
individual police departments directed their officers to enforce immigration laws. 
See Wishnie, supra note 13, at 1089 n.28 (citing WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, THE
CHANGING BOUNDARIES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT: STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL, FINAL
REPORT 6.1-.114 (1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with NAT’L INST. OF 
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In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which together contained 
four provisions increasing state and local participation.30 The most 
important immigration policing provision was § 133 of IIRIRA, 
often referred to as 287(g) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 
(INA).31 This section authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to enter 
into agreements with state and local governments that permit police 
to carry out federal immigration functions such as investigating, 
apprehending, and detaining aliens.32 The original 287(g) program 
included two different models of federal–state partnerships.33 The 
“jail model” empowered officers working in state and local detention 
facilities to identify and process removable aliens who had been 
charged with or convicted of a crime.34 The “task force model” 
authorized state and local police to identify and process aliens 
subject to removal while engaged in their normal policing duties in 
the community.35
From its inception, the 287(g) program—especially the task 
force model—was heavily criticized. Immigrant advocacy groups 
complained that the program promoted racial profiling, caused a 
breakdown of trust between police and immigrant communities, and 
encouraged police to use minor offenses as a pretext for immigration 
JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/188877.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CGV4-6JG6])). 
 30. FORCING OUR BLUES, supra note 29, at 17-18. 
 31. See id. The other three provisions that increased state and local 
participation were: Section 439 of AEDPA, which amended the INA to authorize 
state police to arrest and detain any alien who has reentered the United States after 
having been convicted of a crime and subsequently deported from the country; 
section 372 of IIRIRA, which amended the INA to permit the U.S. Attorney General 
(AG) to deputize state and local police to enforce federal immigration law if the AG 
identifies “urgent circumstances” involving an “actual or imminent mass influx” of 
aliens; and section 642 of IIRIRA, which provides that no state or local entity or 
official may be prohibited from sending, requesting, or receiving information from 
federal immigration officials concerning the legal status of an individual. These 
three provisions are codified as 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252c, 1103(a)(10), and 1373 (1996), 
respectively.  
 32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).  
 33. See Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1776 
n.41 (2015) (citing RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND 
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(g) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1 
(2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6MH7-DUHS]. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id.
1208 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
enforcement.36 These and other criticisms eventually triggered a 
series of investigations by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), Office of the Inspector General. After a number of very 
critical investigative reports by that office,37 ICE abandoned the task 
force model entirely in 2012.38 As of this writing, ICE has thirty-two 
jail model 287(g) agreements with law enforcement agencies in 
sixteen states.39
In 2008, DHS launched an additional federal–state cooperative 
program, “Secure Communities,” designed to detect noncitizens who 
come into the custody of law enforcement.40 For reasons I will 
 36. See, e.g., FORCING OUR BLUES, supra note 29, at 9-11. 
 37. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE
PERFORMANCE OF 287(g) AGREEMENTS 1 (2010), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/ 
Mgmt/OIG_10-63_Mar10.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD8R-D68U] [hereinafter 2010 
OIG REPORT] (reporting that the program suffered from lack of adequate screening 
and training of state and local officials, shoddy supervision by federal immigration 
officials, inadequate program oversight and evaluation, unsatisfactory complaint 
procedures, and insufficient data collection and reporting mechanisms). A later 
report stated that ICE had “made significant progress” toward addressing problems. 
See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE PERFORMANCE OF 
287(g) AGREEMENTS, FY 2013 UPDATE 2 (2013), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/ 
Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-116_Sep13.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLB4-MC5H] [hereinafter 2013 
OIG REPORT]. 
 38. See 2013 OIG REPORT, supra note 37, at 2. The high point for the 
287(g) program was in 2009, when the Department of Homeland Security had sixty-
six memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with state and local law enforcement agencies 
in twenty-three states with 833 active 287(g) officers. See 2010 OIG REPORT, supra
note 37, at 2. According to ICE, since January 2006, the 287(g) program has been 
credited with identifying more than 402,079 potentially removable aliens, and the 
agency has trained and certified more than 1,675 state and local officials to enforce 
immigration law. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration 
and Nationality Act, http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g (last visited Dec. 12, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/7VBB-RZKJ] [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
 39. See Fact Sheet, supra note 38. These agreements follow a uniform 
template setting out the scope and limitations of the delegated authority. Before state 
and local officials can be cross-designated to serve as 287(g) immigration officials, 
they must be screened by the law enforcement agency and independently by ICE 
and undergo a four-week training program provided by ICE. A template of the 
current 287(g) Memorandum of Agreement being used by ICE can be found at U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM OF 
AGREEMENT TEMPLATE (2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/287g_
moa.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8EA-33N4]. 
 40. The description of the Secure Communities program is derived from
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE 
COMMUNITIES, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ [https://perma.cc/NT2G-
A8YU] (last visited Dec. 12, 2016). 
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discuss in detail below, Secure Communities was met with suspicion 
and resistance by state and local authorities. In response to 
widespread criticism, DHS discontinued Secure Communities in 
2014, and replaced it with a program called “Priority Enforcement 
Program” or “PEP.”41 As it turns out, however, the two programs are 
more alike than different. I discuss them together noting the 
differences.  
Secure Communities and its successor program PEP rely on 
fingerprint-based biometric data that is automatically submitted to 
the FBI when individuals are arrested or booked into custody by state 
or local officials. The FBI checks the fingerprints against its 
Integrated Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) to 
see if an arrestee has a criminal record. Under Secure 
Communities/PEP, these prints are also shared with ICE, which 
checks the local arrestee information against ICE’s Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT) for evidence of 
immigration violations. The IDENT system automatically notifies 
ICE personnel (and the originating jail or police station if desired) 
whenever the prints of state or local arrestees match those of a 
person previously encountered and fingerprinted by immigration 
officials. If these checks reveal that an individual is unlawfully 
present or removable due to a criminal conviction, ICE officials have 
discretion to issue a detainer or initiate deportation proceedings 
based on previously identified enforcement priorities.42
When it was replaced by PEP at the end of 2014, Secure 
Communities was operational in all 3,181 jurisdictions within the 
fifty states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. Territories.43
 41. Jerry Markon, DHS Deportation Program Meets with Resistance, WASH.
POST (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dhs-finds-resistance-to-
new-program-to-deport-illegal-immigrants/2015/08/03/4af5985c-36d0-11e5-9739-
170df8af8eb9_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q82L-7A9H0]. 
 42. See Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, 
and All Chief Counsel (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
reform/pdf/detainer-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV4U-8YDX] [hereinafter Morton 
Civil Enforcement Memorandum]; Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/BUP3-Z3250]. 
 43. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
SECURE COMMUNITIES: MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH AUGUST 31, 2014, 2-6 (2014), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interop_stats-fy2014-to-date.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RD9U-T5LL] (last visited Dec. 12, 2016). Full implementation was 
completed in January 2013. See id. at 4. 
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Federal officials were very vocal in assuring participants that Secure 
Communities targeted only the most dangerous illegal immigrants, 
designated as “Level 1” or “high threat” criminal immigrants.44 As 
the program expanded, however, there were widespread claims that it 
had caused the deportation of large numbers of immigrants without 
criminal records or who had committed only lower-level offenses 
such as traffic violations or petty crimes.45 For example, through 
August 31, 2012, more than 166,000 immigrants convicted of crimes 
were removed from the United States after identification through 
Secure Communities.46 Of this group, only a little over 61,000 
immigrants had been convicted of Level 1 offenses.47 The continued 
allegations that Secure Communities was targeting low-level 
offenders created public hostility and resulted in widespread refusals 
to cooperate by governors, mayors, and state and local police. These 
circumstances are what led to the renaming and redesign known as 
“Priority Enforcement Program” or “PEP.” Prior to its reincarnation 
as PEP, some 350 jurisdictions had dropped their participation in 
Secure Communities.48
One other attempt by federal officials to enhance state and local 
immigration enforcement deserves mention. In 2002, relying on an 
unreleased memorandum written by the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) of the U.S. Department of Justice,49 then-Attorney General 
 44. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE
COMMUNITIES: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 5 (2010), http://www.aila.org/File/ 
DownloadEmbeddedFile/51329 [https://perma.cc/9LL5-JC7Y]. 
 45. See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text. 
 46. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, SECURE COMMUNITIES: MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH AUGUST 31,
2012, 2 (2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interop_stats-
fy2012-to-date.pdf [https://perma.cc/668J-KT8W]. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Markon, supra note 41. According to the Washington Post, “While 
DHS says more than 30 of the nation’s largest law enforcement agencies have 
indicated a willingness to work with the agency on PEP, few have publicly said they 
will participate.” Id. In its 2015 year-end report, DHS claims that it made 
presentations to over 2,000 jurisdictions during 2015 and that “16 of the top 25 
jurisdictions with the largest number of previously declined detainers are now 
participating in PEP.” U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., DHS RELEASES END OF FISCAL YEAR 2015 STATISTICS (2015), http://www.ice. 
gov/news/releases/dhs-releases-end-fiscal-year-2015-statistics [https://perma.cc/9SR2-
LDC4]. 
 49. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Apr. 3, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/ 
files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf [https://perma.cc/A75U-YPVV]. The 2002 OLC 
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Ashcroft announced that state and local officials have “inherent 
authority” to enforce both civil and criminal provisions of federal 
immigration law.50 The 2002 opinion reversed an unbroken line of 
OLC precedent, the most recent in 1996, taking the view that non-
federal officers are generally authorized to enforce federal criminal
statutes, including criminal provisions of the immigration law, but 
they lack authority to enforce federal civil immigration law.51 The 
assertion that state and local officials have inherent civil enforcement 
authority has been strongly contested in the academy,52 in police 
departments,53 and in the courts.54 As I argue in the next section, the
memorandum was released pursuant to a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act. 
See Nat’l Council of La Raza v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 411 F.3d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 50. John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks on the National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/ 
archive/ag/speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm [https://perma.cc/M96U-
V6TW]. 
 51. See Memorandum from Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Off. of Legal Counsel, on Assistance by State and 
Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens (Feb. 5, 1996), http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1996/02/31/op-olc-v020-p0026.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
XK49-3FUB]; Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice Off. of Legal Counsel, to Joseph R. Davis, Assistant Dir. Legal 
Counsel, FBI, on Handling of INS Warrants of Deportation in Relation to NCIC 
Wanted Person File (Apr. 11, 1989), http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/1989_ 
olc_opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHS2-KH4C]. 
 52. Compare Kobach, supra note 6, at 199-201, 232 with Michael A. 
Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, 
and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 52-53 (2007). 
 53. Many police officers oppose any role in immigration enforcement. 
While a few police agencies have made independent decisions to get involved in 
immigration enforcement, few have embraced the theory of inherent authority. See 
generally FORCING OUR BLUES, supra note 29, at 35. 
 54. Compare United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301-02 
(10th Cir. 1984) (finding that state highway patrol officer’s consultation with a local 
INS official did not defeat officer’s probable cause for arresting driver of vehicle 
transporting passengers who did not have identification papers or green cards), and 
United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1295-96 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(denying motion to suppress where police officer arrested defendant without 
verifying he was an illegal alien previously deported for a felony conviction—
prerequisites for arrest under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c)—on grounds that federal law “does 
not limit or displace the preexisting general authority of state or local police officers 
to investigate and make arrests for violations of federal law”), and United States v. 
Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that local and state 
law enforcement officials have implicit authority to make arrests for federal 
immigration law violations, regardless of whether a state law affirmatively 
authorized them to do so), with Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475-76 
(9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 
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reasoning of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Arizona v. United States
likely put this argument to rest.55
B. State Immigration Policing Legislation 
At around the same time the federal government was 
expanding immigration policing programs, states began passing their 
own immigration enforcement legislation. The earliest was 
California’s Proposition 187 § 4, which required police to verify the 
immigration status of any person who was arrested and suspected of 
being an illegal alien.56 Shortly after passage, a California district 
court struck down § 4 as preempted by federal law.57 After a lull of 
nearly a decade, the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center by 
illegal immigrant terrorists renewed interest in state immigration 
enforcement. Striving to avoid the pitfalls of Proposition 187, 
lawmakers in Colorado, Georgia, Oklahoma, and Missouri passed 
statutes requiring police to verify the immigration status of arrestees 
or report to U.S. immigration officials if they had reason to suspect a 
detainee was an illegal alien.58
F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999) (requiring a finding that state law affirmatively 
granted local police authority to enforce criminal provisions of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act and emphasizing the authorization’s limitation to criminal 
violations).
 55. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508-09 (2012). See also 
infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. 
 56. See ILLEGAL ALIENS, INELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC SERVICES, VERIFICATION
AND REPORTING, CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 187 § 4 (1994), http://repository. 
uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props/1104/ [https://perma.cc/G2Y5-BAQD]. It also required 
police to inform the arrestee, the Attorney General of California, and the United 
States Immigration and Naturalization Service of the arrestee’s apparent illegal 
status. Id. 
 57. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-
87 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The court reasoned that § 4 comprised a “comprehensive [state] 
scheme to detect and report the presence and effect the removal of illegal aliens” and 
invited state agents to make “independent determinations” of immigration status. Id.
at 769-70. The decision was originally appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, but the appeal was dismissed when California Governor Gray Davis 
refused to defend the law. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Davis Won’t Appeal Prop. 187 
Ruling, Ending Court Battles, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 1999), http://articles.latimes. 
com/1999/jul/29/news/mn-60700 [https://perma.cc/UF92-2VX9].
 58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-29-103 (2)(a)(I) (2010) (“A peace officer who 
has probable cause that an arrestee for a criminal offense is not legally present in the 
United States shall report such arrestee to the United States immigration and 
customs enforcement office if the arrestee is not held at a detention facility. If the 
arrestee is held at a detention facility and the county sheriff reasonably believes that 
the arrestee is not legally present in the United States, the sheriff shall report such 
 The New Immigration Federalism 1213 
The first state statute requiring immigration verification not 
only of arrestees but also of those being stopped or detained was 
Arizona S.B. 1070. While other states, including Arizona, had 
entered into 287(g) agreements,59 S.B. 1070 was the first nonfederal
statute that called for direct, on-the-street immigration enforcement 
by state officials without federal supervision.60 Other state laws had 
prompted legal challenges,61 but the breadth of S.B. 1070 and its 
explicit immigration policing focus led the U.S. Department of 
arrestee to the federal immigration and customs enforcement office.”); GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-4-14(b), (c) (2011) (“(b) When any person is confined, for any period, in 
the jail of a county or municipality or a jail operated by a regional jail authority in 
compliance with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a 
reasonable effort shall be made to determine the nationality of the person so 
confined. (c) When any foreign national is confined, for any period, in a county or 
municipal jail, a reasonable effort shall be made to verify that such foreign national 
has been lawfully admitted to the United States and if lawfully admitted, that such 
lawful status has not expired. If verification of lawful status cannot be made from 
documents in the possession of the foreign national, verification shall be made 
within 48 hours through a query to the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) of 
the United States Department of Homeland Security or other office or agency 
designated by the federal government. If the foreign national is determined to be an 
illegal alien, the keeper of the jail or other officer shall notify the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, or other office or agency designated for 
notification by the federal government.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 577.680(1) (West 
2011) (“If verification of the nationality or lawful immigration status of any person 
who is charged and confined to jail for any period of time cannot be made from 
documents in the possession of the prisoner or after a reasonable effort on the part of 
the arresting agency to determine the nationality or immigration status of the person 
so confined, verification shall be made by the arresting agency within forty-eight 
hours through a query to the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) of the United 
States Department of Homeland Security or other office or agency designated for 
that purpose by the United States Department of Homeland Security. If it is 
determined that the prisoner is in the United States unlawfully, the arresting agency 
shall notify the United States Department of Homeland Security.”); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 171.2(A)-(B) (West 2011) (“When a person charged with a felony or 
driving under the influence . . . is confined, for any period, in the jail for the county, 
any municipality or a jail operated by a regional jail authority, a reasonable effort 
shall be made to determine the citizenship status of the person so confined.”). 
 59. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. 
 60. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 61. See, e.g., Thomas v. Henry, 260 P.3d 1251, 1256, 1262 (Okla. 2011) 
(holding unconstitutional subsection 5(c) of OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 171.2, 
which deals with a presumption that a foreign national is a flight risk, but leaving 
intact subsections (A) and (B), which relate to verifying citizenship status of people 
in jail). For a description of some earlier lawsuits, see Julia Preston, In Reversal, 
Courts Uphold Local Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2008), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/us/10immig.html [https://perma.cc/Y6CQ-NBGX]. 
1214 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
Justice to file a lawsuit, which ultimately made its way to the 
Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States.62
The DOJ lawsuit challenged on preemption grounds four 
provisions of S.B. 1070, of which two—§ 2(B) and § 6—were 
immigration policing laws. The Supreme Court struck down § 6 and 
upheld § 2(B).63 Section 6 would have permitted state officers to 
make warrantless arrests based on probable cause to believe a 
suspect had committed “any public offense that makes [him] 
removable.”64 The Court concluded that immigration law does not 
permit arrests for noncriminal offenses, even by federal immigration 
officials,65 and § 6 would “create[] an obstacle to the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress” by authorizing additional arrest power.66
The Supreme Court did not specifically address the claim made in a 
2002 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that state and local 
police have “inherent authority” to enforce civil immigration law,67
 62. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
 63. Id. at 2510. The United States had sought to enjoin six sections of S.B. 
1070: Section 2(B) (requiring police to verify the immigration status of persons 
stopped or arrested if reasonable suspicion persons are illegal aliens), § 3 (making it 
a state crime to fail to carry “alien registration papers”), two portions of § 5 (making 
it a crime for an illegal alien to apply for, solicit, or perform work in the state and
making it a state crime to transport or harbor illegal aliens or encourage them to 
relocate to Arizona), § 6 (permitting warrantless arrests for certain civil immigration 
violations), and § 10 (permitting impoundment of vehicles used to transport or 
harbor illegal aliens). The district court enjoined § 2(B), § 3, the first part of § 5, and 
denied injunction relief with regard to the second portion of § 5 and § 10. See United 
States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010). The State of 
Arizona appealed the denial of injunctive relief, and the motion was affirmed by a 
divided Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Arizona, 641 
F.3d 339, 366 (9th Cir. 2011). Judge Paez wrote the majority opinion, joined by 
Judge Noonan, who also wrote a separate concurrence. Id. at 366 (Noonan, J., 
concurring). Judge Carol Bea dissented from the majority’s holding with respect to 
§ 2(B) and § 6. Id. at 369 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
 64. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3883(A)(5) (2010)). 
 65. It is not generally a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United 
State. Under such circumstances, officials are to issue an administrative document 
called a “Notice to Appear.” Id.
 66. Id. at 2507. 
 67. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text. While the Supreme 
Court did not address this issue, the Ninth Circuit opinion in United States v. 
Arizona strongly disagreed with the argument that state and local officials have 
inherent authority to make arrests for violations of federal civil immigration law. 
641 F.3d at 363-66.  
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but the Court’s conclusion that arrests for civil violations lack “the 
usual predicate for an arrest” appears to foreclose this argument.68
The Court upheld § 2(B),69 which requires state officers to 
make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” 
of any person stopped, detained, or arrested on some other legitimate 
basis if there is “reasonable suspicion . . . that the person is an alien 
and is unlawfully present in the United States.”70 The Court reasoned 
that, unlike § 6, § 2(B) requires state officers to investigate 
immigration status only after the individual has been detained for 
some other offense.71
 68. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505. Awarding state officials “inherent 
authority” to make arrests for civil violations would be to reinstate the § 6 power 
disallowed by the Supreme Court in Arizona. See Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that, absent express 
authorization by federal statute or federal officials, state and local officials lack 
power to detain or arrest an individual based solely on known or suspected civil 
immigration violations). At one point, some members of Congress sought to 
empower state and local police to enforce civil immigration law and to withhold 
federal funds from any state that failed to enact parallel authorizing legislation. 
These efforts were widely unpopular with most police agencies and they failed to 
pass in Congress. See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and 
Immigration Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America,
38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 26-27 (2006) (discussing the proposed House bill called the 
Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal (“CLEAR”) Act and its Senate 
counterpart, the Homeland Security Enhancement Act (“HSEA”)). Neither bill was 
brought to a vote. Bills with the same names were introduced in the 109th Congress 
(S. 1362 and H.R. 3137), but neither made it out of its committee. 
 69. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2509. 
 70. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010). The section also provides 
that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status 
determined before the person is released.” Id. The ordinary process for performing 
status checks is for state officials to contact ICE, which maintains a database of 
immigration records. Section 2(B) is supported by two additional provisions. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(A), (H). Section 2(A) requires state and local 
officials engaged in these investigative activities to fully enforce federal 
immigration law. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 2010 
Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 113 (S.B. 1070) § 2(A), as amended by 2010 Ariz. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 211 (H.B. 2162) § 3 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 
(2010)) (“No official or agency of this state or a county, city, town or other political 
subdivision of this state may limit or restrict the enforcement of federal immigration 
laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law.”). Section 2(H) creates a 
private cause of action allowing any legal resident of Arizona to seek money 
damages against any government official or agency that adopts a policy “limit[ing] 
or restrict[ing] the enforcement of federal immigration laws . . . to less than the full 
extent permitted by federal law.” See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (H).  
 71. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2509. The Court reasoned that 
§ 2(B) does not “put state officers in the position of holding aliens in custody for 
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Five other states in addition to Arizona—Utah, Indiana, 
Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina—have enacted provisions 
that authorize or require state and local police to verify the 
immigration status of individuals detained pursuant to ordinary law 
enforcement actions.72 The Alabama73 and South Carolina74 statutes 
possible unlawful presence without federal discretion and supervision.” Id. It is also 
broadly consistent with federal immigration provisions that invite state officials to 
“communicate” with the federal government about suspected immigration violations 
and obligate the office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to respond to any 
request by state officials for verification of immigration status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 
(g)(10)(A) (2012). The Court explicitly preserved the possibility of future 
preemption challenges should § 2(B) be applied to permit state officials to enforce 
immigration law without federal oversight. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 
2510.
 72. In 2012, five additional states—Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Rhode 
Island, and West Virginia—introduced omnibus immigration bills containing 
provisions requiring police officers to verify immigration status during lawful stops. 
None of these bills were enacted. See Ann Morse et al., State Omnibus Immigration 
Legislation and Legal Changes, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 
27, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/omnibus-immigration-legislation. 
aspx [https://perma.cc/TRL2-ZAA9]. 
 73. ALA. CODE § 31-13-12 (2011). Section 12(a) states: “Upon any lawful 
stop, detention, or arrest made by a state, county, or municipal law enforcement 
officer of this state in the enforcement of any state law or ordinance of any political 
subdivision thereof, where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien 
who is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, 
when practicable, to determine the citizenship and immigration status of the person, 
except if the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation. Such 
determination shall be made by contacting the federal government pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) and relying upon any verification provided by the federal 
government.” Id. § 12(a).
Section 12(b) states: “Any alien who is arrested and booked into 
custody shall have his or her immigration status determined . . . by contacting the 
federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) within 24 hours of the time of the 
alien’s arrest.” Id. § 12(b). The Alabama statute requires police to verify with the 
federal government the legal status of any person who is arrested for failure to have 
a motor vehicle license while driving. Id. § 18. In addition, any such arrestee who is 
determined to be an illegal alien is to be detained as a flight risk until prosecution or 
transfer to U.S. immigration. Id. The statute also requires verification of legal status 
for any person charged with a crime for which bail or confinement is required. Id.
§ 19. 
 74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-170 (2012). Subsection (A) provides: “If a law 
enforcement officer of this state or political subdivision of this State lawfully stops, 
detains, investigates, or arrests a person for a criminal offense, and during the 
commission of the stop, detention, investigation, or arrest the officer has reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the person is unlawfully present in the United States, the 
officer shall make a reasonable effort, when practicable, to determine whether the 
person is lawfully present in the United States, unless the determination would 
hinder or obstruct an investigation.” Id. at (A). Subsection (B) provides that an 
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mirror the Arizona statute in requiring (the Georgia statute merely 
“authorizes”75) police to determine the immigration status of persons 
who have been stopped, detained, investigated,76 or arrested when 
police have “reasonable suspicion” that the detainees may be illegal 
aliens. Utah’s provision is similar, requiring police to verify the 
status of any individual they stop, detain, or arrest if the detainee is 
unable to provide verification of legal status.77 Like Arizona S.B. 
1070, Utah, Alabama, and Indiana78 also include provisions that 
create sanctions against state and local officials who fail to fully 
enforce state and federal law.79 Finally, Utah authorizes state and 
individual is “presumed to be lawfully present in the United States” if the person 
presents identification documents, including a driver’s or picture identification 
issued by South Carolina or another state, a passport or military identification, or a 
tribal picture identification. Id. at (B). In addition, the statute provides for the arrest 
of any person who is operating a motor vehicle on a public highway without a 
driver’s license. Id.
 75. The Georgia statute provides in pertinent part: “[D]uring any 
investigation of a criminal suspect by a peace officer, when such officer has 
probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a criminal violation, the 
officer shall be authorized to seek to verify such suspect’s immigration status when 
the suspect is unable to provide [documentation of legal status].” GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-5-100(b) (West 2012). Section 14 of the Georgia statute also requires officials 
to make a “reasonable effort”—by reviewing documents or contacting the federal 
Law Enforcement Support Center—to determine the legal status of any “foreign 
national” who is confined in a state or local facility. Id. § 42-4-14(c) (West 2011). 
 76. The South Carolina and Georgia statutes are arguably the broadest in 
scope, authorizing police to verify the legal status of any individual they are 
“investigating.” See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-170(A) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
5-100(b) (West 2012). 
 77. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1003(1) (LexisNexis 2011). The statute also 
requires verification when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the driver or 
passengers are violating laws on transporting or smuggling illegal aliens, and when a 
person is booked into a jail or other correctional facility. Id. § 76-9-1003(2)-(3). 
 78. Indiana requires legal status verification only for “[a] committed 
criminal offender.” IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-1-2(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2011). Under 
Indiana law, “‘committed’ means placed under the custody or made a ward of the 
department of correction,” including in “a community transition program.” Id. § 11-
8-1-5. “Criminal offender” means “a person of any age who is convicted of a 
crime.” Id. § 11-8-1-9(1). 
 79. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1006(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (prohibiting state 
or local government agencies or officials from limiting or restricting the authority of 
local government agencies to help enforce federal immigration law); Act 2011-535 
§§ 5, 6, 2011 Ala. Legis. Serv. (West) (providing penalties for state agencies 
adopting policies limiting the enforcement of federal immigration laws or the new 
state immigration laws); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-18.2-4 & 5-2-18.2-5 (LexisNexis 
2011) (prohibiting governmental bodies from “restrict[ing] the enforcement of 
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local police to make warrantless arrests if they have “reasonable 
cause to believe” the individual is “subject to a civil removal order 
issued by an immigration judge.”80
C. The Backlash: State Immigration Resistance 
Beginning in the 1990s, police leaders, civil liberties groups, 
and scholars began to identify some serious negative consequences 
of immigration federalism. Task force model 287(g) agreements, 
which authorized police officers to carry out federal immigration 
enforcement, met with extensive criticism, including allegations of 
racial profiling, compromise of public safety from diversion of local 
policing resources, and loss of trust in immigrant communities.81 As 
a result of these and other negative consequences, some jurisdictions 
withdrew from participating in the 287(g) task force model program 
and eventually the program was terminated.82 Critics raised similar 
allegations against states that adopted immigration policing pursuant 
to state statute, especially emphasizing the racial targeting of 
suspected illegal aliens and the fraught relations between police and 
immigrant communities.83
The most vehement criticism was reserved for Secure 
Communities. The program was sold to states and localities as a 
mechanism for ridding communities of dangerous criminal aliens by 
identifying for deportation illegal immigrants who had committed 
serious crimes or who otherwise posed a risk to public safety.84
During the pendency of the program, ICE claimed to have explicitly 
prioritized enforcement against criminal aliens, resulting in an 89% 
increase in the number of deportees with criminal convictions and a 
federal immigration laws” and allowing citizens to bring suit to compel the 
governmental body to comply). 
 80. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-2(5) (LexisNexis 2011) (permitting 
warrantless arrests if officer has “reasonable cause to believe” the individual is 
“subject to a civil removal order issued by an immigration judge”). 
 81. See FORCING OUR BLUES, supra note 29, at 9-11.
 82. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. 
 84. See SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 40. Under the program, jail 
officials submit fingerprint records of arrestees to the FBI to be checked against 
DHS databases for evidence of immigration violations. If a match is found, that 
information is sent to the local ICE office, which has discretion to file “detainers” 
for those whom ICE wants the local organization to hold or transfer to its custody. 
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29% decrease in the deportation of noncriminals.85 Critics were 
alarmed to learn that many of the “criminal convictions” that had led 
to deportation during this period were either traffic offenses or 
convictions for immigration offenses (typically illegal entry, a petty 
misdemeanor under federal law).86 According to an analysis by the 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse of ICE’s records 
obtained through FOIA requests, the most serious charge in fully one 
half of the total deportations was an immigration or traffic offense.87
A New York Times investigation of internal government records 
revealed that two-thirds of the nearly two million individuals 
deported since 2009 had committed only minor infractions, including 
traffic offenses, or had no criminal record at all.88 The use of federal 
immigration detainers also increased dramatically under Secure 
Communities. ICE employs detainers to obtain information or to 
request that immigration violators be held for an additional forty-
eight hours beyond the time they would have been released.89 The 
use of detainers dramatically increased under Secure Communities, 
rising from 15,000 detainers in fiscal year 2007, when Secure 
Communities was launched, to a current high of over 250,000 per 
 85. Nick DeFiesta & Christopher Peak, Officials Protest Secure 
Communities Program, YALE DAILY NEWS (Feb. 21, 2012), http://yaledailynews.com/ 
blog/2012/02/21/officials-protest-secure-communities-program/ [https://perma.cc/T5BW-
7LNB]. 
 86. Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (Apr. 17, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/349/ [https:// 
perma.cc/AV25-R7HX]. 
 87. Id.
 88. Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor 
Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html?_r= [https://perma.cc/ 
L3EP-TBFG]. The Times reported that the number of deported immigrants whose 
most serious offense was listed as a traffic violation “quadrupled from 43,000 during 
the last five years of President George W. Bush’s administration to 193,000 during 
the five years” of the Obama administration. Id. 
 89. An “immigration detainer” is a document by which ICE notifies other 
law enforcement agencies of its interest in individual aliens whom these agencies are 
detaining. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2011). ICE uses a standard detainer form (Form I-
247) to record actions it has taken that could lead to the alien’s removal, for 
example, determining “there is reason to believe” the alien is removable or initiating 
removal proceedings. The form also allows ICE to request other agencies to take 
actions that could facilitate removal, such as continuing to hold an individual or 
notifying ICE before releasing an individual. See Immigration Detainer—Notice of 
Action, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf [http://perma.cc/G49M-D3ZN] (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2016).  
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year.90 Secure Communities also “resulted in the issuance of more 
[immigration] detainers for persons at earlier stages [of] criminal 
proceedings” and more detainers for minor criminal offenders than 
ever before.91
In light of these revelations, support for Secure Communities 
plummeted. Over a short period of time, multiple police agencies 
announced that they would no longer participate in the program or in 
its successor program, PEP.92 While police agencies could not avoid 
submitting fingerprint records to the FBI (and ultimately to DHS) 
without compromising their own law enforcement goals,93 more and 
more announced that they would not cooperate with ICE “detainers.”  
A December 2016 report by the Center for Immigration Studies 
lists approximately 300 jurisdictions, including four states and the 
District of Columbia, that have adopted policies restricting the extent 
to which they honor ICE-issued detainers.94 Some involve broad 
limitations prohibiting local law enforcement from honoring any ICE 
detainers. Others are more narrow, restricting compliance to 
detainers for individuals who have actually been convicted of serious 
crimes or to circumstances in which DHS has agreed to reimburse 
the locality for the cost of the additional detention. A number of 
localities have refused to honor detainers unless they are 
accompanied by a judicial warrant supported by probable cause. A 
2015 Department of Homeland Security report estimated that 
 90. Christopher Lasch, The Faulty Legal Arguments Behind Immigration 
Detainers, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Dec. 18, 2013), https:// 
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/faulty-legal-arguments-behind-immigration-
detainers [https://perma.cc/75KY-3RN3]. 
 91. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION 
DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42690.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/85S7-8YR3]. 
 92. See Julián Aguilar, Activists Sue 10 Federal Agencies Over Secrecy in 
Deporting Alleged Criminals, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Jan. 20, 2016, 5:06 PM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2016/01/20/immigration-enforcement-agencies-sued-
alledgedly-wi/ [https://perma.cc/38G3-825Y]. 
 93. Police agencies submit fingerprints to determine if a detainee has a 
previous criminal record and whether there are outstanding warrants for the detained 
individual. Once the fingerprints are submitted to the FBI, they are automatically 
submitted to DHS for comparison with its database. See MANUEL, supra note 91, at 
1-2.
 94. See Griffith & Vaughan, supra note 2; see also LAW ENFORCEMENT
SYSTEMS & ANALYSIS: DECLINED DETAINER OUTCOME REPORT, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY 27-28 (2014), cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/Declined%20detainers% 
20report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4X8-FCSX] [hereinafter DECLINED DETAINER 
REPORT]. A partially redacted copy of the report was obtained by the Center for 
Immigration Studies.  
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between January 1, 2014, (when ICE began tracking declinations of 
immigration detainers) and June 2015 (before the July 2015 
implementation of PEP), state and local law enforcement agencies 
declined a total of 16,495 immigration detainers.95
Federal court decisions provide strong legal support for these 
resistance policies. For example, courts have upheld federal detainers 
against Tenth Amendment challenges only by construing them as 
requests for detention or transfer of suspected illegal aliens, rather 
than commands.96 In addition, courts have held that states and 
localities violate the Fourth Amendment if, without probable cause, 
they detain a suspected illegal immigrant pursuant to a federal 
detainer beyond the time the subject would otherwise have been 
released from state or local custody.97
More recently, state and local resistance has created its own 
backlash, this time by federal legislators. The murder of Kathryn 
Steinle in San Francisco focused renewed attention on similar 
incidents in other cities where sanctuary policies were alleged to 
 95. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 5 (Dec. 22, 
2015), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/fy2015 
removalStats.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH6T-9FRM].  
 96. See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640-41 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(agreeing with the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, the Third Circuit 
concluded that detainers are not mandatory and to conclude otherwise would violate 
the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering rule); Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F. 
Supp. 3d 791, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-
cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *5 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); see also Jimenez 
Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11 C 5452, 2016 WL 5720465, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 
2016) (holding that ICE’s detention program, which seeks to detain subjects without 
a warrant, in the absence of a determination by ICE that the subjects are likely to 
escape before a warrant can be obtained, exceeds its statutory authority). 
 97. See, e.g., Villars, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 807-08; Galarza, 2012 WL 1080020 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 745 F.3d at 642; Miranda-
Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *10-11; Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 
19, 29, 33-34 (D.R.I. 2014), aff’d, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015). Some jurisdictions 
appear to have adopted policies that forbid state or local officials from providing 
information about illegal immigrants to ICE. A memorandum from the Office of the 
Inspector General at the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that these policies 
violate federal immigration law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1373. The analysis in the 
memorandum is limited and does not engage other relevant legal issues. 
Memorandum from Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., to Karol V. Mason, 
Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice 
Referral of Allegations of Potential Violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 by Grant 
Recipients (May 31, 2016), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/1607.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/PFR5-7G6V] [Hereinafter Memorandum to Karol V. Mason] (Posted to 
oig.justice.gov on July 28, 2016). 
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have resulted in the release of immigrants who went on to commit 
violent crimes.98 In response, the House of Representatives passed 
the “Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act,” which would have 
cut federal funding for local governments that harbor illegal 
immigrants, bar police from asking about immigration status, or fail 
to honor detainers.99 Although the national legislation was not 
ultimately passed, there have also been state legislative efforts to 
curtail local sanctuary policies.100
II. IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM: WHAT WENT WRONG?
Scholars have coined the term “immigration federalism” to 
describe affirmative immigration enforcement by state and local 
officials.101 It is more in line with the broader meaning of the term 
“federalism,” however, to encompass in the term all the ways in 
which states and localities have sought to share power over 
immigration with federal authorities.102 I use the term in this broader 
sense in order to highlight that state and local enforcement policies 
and state and local sanctuary policies are both species of 
immigration federalism. They represent differing views by states and 
localities as to what policies best promote a productive and healthy 
relationship with their immigrant communities. More specifically, 
current sanctuary policies have arisen in large part as a movement 
against the perceived negative consequences of immigration 
policing.103 To understand this argument, one must appreciate the 
features of immigration policing that have fueled the current rise in 
resistance policies.  
 98. See Littlefield, supra note 1. 
 99. See Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act, H.R. 3009, 114th Cong. 
(2015). H.R. 3009 was received in the Senate and referred to the Judiciary 
Committee, but there has been no further action on the bill in the Senate since. Id.
 100. See, e.g., Sarah Posner, A South Carolina Bill Would Hold Faith 
Groups Liable for Refugees They Settle—Including Their Crimes, WASH. POST (Mar. 
25, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/03/25/a-new-
south-carolina-bill-might-hold-churches-liable-for-refugees-they-settle-including-their-
crimes/ [http://perma.cc/CT4K-SACD] (detailing a state bill, ultimately defeated, 
which was designed to curtail religiously based sanctuary efforts). 
 101. See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, 
Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2076 (2013). 
 102. Id. at 2075-76. 
 103. While sanctuary policies have a long history that predates their current 
popularity, the current resistance movement is significantly different from the older 
sanctuary movement. See infra notes 207-10; see also Michael J. Davidson, 
Sanctuary: A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 609 (2014).  
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Supporters of immigration policing argue that involving state 
and local police vastly “multiplies” the nation’s ability to enforce 
immigration law:104 As law enforcement officers vastly outnumber 
federal immigration agents, it makes sense for police to investigate 
suspected immigration violators during routine patrols.105 For 
supporters, this is a win-win situation: State officials can pursue 
federal immigration priorities by simply adding immigration 
enforcement to policing activities they are already doing.  
Critics respond that immigration enforcement cannot simply be 
“added on” without causing fundamental changes in the shape of 
policing. Rather, involving state and local police distorts law 
enforcement decisions and diverts resources away from ordinary 
crime fighting. Supporters dispute this claim on the grounds that 
immigration enforcement is triggered only after police have detained 
or incarcerated a suspected alien in connection with some other 
crime. This Part argues that the critics of immigration policing are 
right: Police awareness that law enforcement actions can lead to 
immigration enforcement has a distorting effect on upstream policing 
decisions.106
A. Distorted Policing 
Proponents resist accusations that immigration policing distorts 
ordinary law enforcement by pointing out that state immigration laws 
permit immigration investigation only after a suspect has been 
stopped, detained, or arrested pursuant to “any other [state or local] 
law.”107 The same is true for § 287(g) jail programs and Secure 
 104. See Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State and Local 
Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugee, Border Security, and Int’l Law, the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties and the H. Judiciary Comm.,
111th Cong. 5-6 (2009) (testimony of Kris W. Kobach, Professor, University of 
Missouri (Kansas City) School of Law), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/2009/04/Kobach090402.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D4N-QWFY] (referring to the 
value of § 287(g) as a force multiplier). 
 105. The perceived need for a “force multiplier” is particularly salient in 
states on the nation’s southern border, where it has proved difficult to stem the tide 
of illegal immigration. 
 106. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On 
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
 107. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012); COMMON MYTHS 
AND FACTS REGARDING SENATE BILL 1070, OFFICE OF ARIZONA GOVERNOR JANICE 
K. BREWER 1 (2010), http://www2.fiu.edu/~revellk/pad3802/Myths.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/BT7Y-GXD8] (last visited Dec. 12, 2016) (“S.B. 1070 is a ‘secondary 
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Communities/PEP: They are triggered only after police have 
detained an individual for some other, nonimmigration offense.  
While proponents’ claim is superficially true, it is also deeply 
misleading. The basic argument is that immigration policing targets 
only “criminals” who have been identified prior to and independently 
from any investigation of their immigration status. This assertion is 
meant to reassure critics by suggesting two implications. First, that 
immigration policing focuses only on criminals is meant to imply 
that it is good way to target (for investigation and deportation) a 
subgroup of immigrants who endanger public safety. Second, and 
relatedly, the claim is meant to suggest that police officers will 
identify these criminals independently—in the course of ordinary 
policing activities—and only then investigate and refer them to 
federal officials for immigration enforcement. Neither of these 
implications follows from the claim. 
That immigration policing only targets “criminals” is belied by 
considering the two most common types of police stops that could 
lead to immigration enforcement under current programs: traffic 
stops and investigative “Terry stops.” Neither of these stops is a 
good mechanism for identifying “dangerous” people who should be 
priorities for immigration investigation and enforcement. Take traffic 
stops. While traffic violations are technically “crimes”—and in many 
states they are arrestable offenses—we do not ordinarily think of 
traffic violators as “dangerous criminals” unless they have recklessly 
or repeatedly caused serious harm on the road. State traffic laws 
criminalize a wide range of conduct, including reckless driving or 
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, but also failing to 
signal or driving with a headlight out. Some traffic laws do prohibit 
dangerous, criminal conduct, but others are merely regulatory. Police 
officers have a huge amount of discretion about whether and when to 
enforce most traffic laws, and it is hard to argue that violating these 
enforcement’ law. S.B. 1070 requires that there must first be a ‘lawful stop, 
detention or arrest made by a law enforcement official or a law enforcement agency 
. . . in the enforcement of any other law or ordinance. . . .’ A.R.S. § 11-1051(B).”); 
Kris W. Kobach, Defending Arizona: Its Statute Will Withstand the Inevitable—and 
Already Begun—Challenges in Court, NAT’L REV. (June 7, 2010), http://www. 
nationalreview.com/article/243409/defending-arizona-kris-w-kobach [http://perma.cc/ 
EK3B-L223] (“[C]ritics have claimed that the law requires police officers to stop 
people in order to question them about their immigration status. . . . But Section 2 of 
S.B. 1070 stipulates that in order for its provisions to apply, a law-enforcement 
officer must first make a ‘lawful stop, detention, or arrest . . . in the enforcement of 
any other law or ordinance of a county, city or town or this state.’”). 
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laws, while technically criminal conduct, makes one a dangerous 
“criminal.”  
The same is true of street stops. Police officers are authorized 
to conduct brief, temporary investigative “Terry stops” of individuals 
whose conduct is merely suspicious.108 Terry stops, which are 
designed to give police a set of graduated responses to suspected or 
unfolding criminal activity, require a very small probability—
reasonable suspicion—that an individual might be involved in 
criminal activity.109 Reasonable suspicion may be based on a quite 
small quantum of highly ambiguous facts,110 and a Terry stop may or 
may not lead to an arrest or even continued investigation if police are 
unable to confirm the suspicions that led to the stop. If police officers 
are permitted (or required) to verify the immigration status of any 
individual who is stopped or detained in these kinds of 
circumstances, it is hard to argue that they are targeting the subset of 
“dangerous criminals” who are the most deserving of immigration 
investigation or enforcement. 
Of course, 287(g) jail model agreements and Secure 
Communities/PEP do not rely on mere traffic stops or Terry stops. 
As they are triggered only when an individual has actually been 
arrested, booked, and placed in custody, one might have thought that 
these programs are better suited to identify dangerous, illegal 
immigrants worthy of deportation. It turns out, however, that one of 
the most persistent criticisms of Secure Communities is precisely 
that it has resulted in excessive deportations of minor offenders.111
The reason is that many minor traffic offenses and street crimes are 
arrestable offenses, which can be used to funnel minor violators into 
Secure Communities/PEP or the 287(g) program. 
One response to these arguments is that targeting minor 
offenders for immigration enforcement is unobjectionable because 
all illegal immigrants are criminals, having arrived or remained in 
violation of immigration law. In fact, most illegal aliens are only 
guilty of civil offenses (and subject to civil sanctions) rather than 
criminal ones, and are not “criminals” under the law. Moreover, 
putting labels aside, it is important to acknowledge that virtually no 
one thinks we can (or should) deport all eleven million illegal aliens 
 108. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968). 
 109. See id. (concluding that a reasonable person observing the defendants in 
this case could conclude that the men were armed and intended to commit a robbery 
based on the officer’s reasonable observation). 
 110. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
 111. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text. 
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who currently reside in the United States. If so, it makes sense to 
focus our investigative resources on the ones who actually threaten 
public safety. That immigration policing targets minor offenders 
makes it a very poor mechanism for identifying dangerous aliens 
deserving of deportation.  
The second implication alleged to follow from the claim that 
immigration policing is directed only at independently identified 
criminal aliens is that policing decisions will be not be influenced by 
the promise of downstream immigration investigation. Supporters 
argue that police officers will decide whether to stop, detain, or arrest 
particular suspects in the ordinary course of their law enforcement 
duties without any consideration of whether the targets might be 
illegal aliens. Similarly, ICE claims that under Secure Communities, 
now PEP, “[F]ederal officers make immigration enforcement 
decisions . . . only after a completely independent decision by state 
and local law enforcement to arrest an individual for a criminal 
violation of state law separate and apart from any violations of 
immigration law.”112 To the contrary, the potential for back-end 
immigration enforcement strongly influences front-end investigative 
choices made by police officers engaged in ordinary policing. 
Consider the following scenario: Suppose a police officer 
clocks a driver going 45 mph in a 40 mph zone. Speed laws, like 
many traffic laws and other low-level criminal offenses, are routinely 
underenforced. This means that the decision whether to stop a mildly 
speeding automobile will necessarily depend upon other factors, 
which may or may not be related to road safety, for example, 
whether the police officer has reached her “quota” of traffic tickets 
or whether the automobile is a make and model often used by drug 
dealers. Suppose now that when the officer clocks the vehicle’s 
speed at 45 mph, she also notices that there are five men in the car, 
all Hispanic. Now the officer has an additional reason why she might 
wish to stop the speeding driver: She suspects that the car packed 
with Hispanic men is headed for a site where illegal immigrants hire 
themselves out as construction day laborers. (Of course, this scenario 
also poses a high risk of racial profiling, which I address in detail 
below.)
This does not add up to reasonable suspicion of any 
immigration crime, but it doesn’t matter because the officer already 
has probable cause to stop the driver for speeding. Once the 
 112. Secure Communities: Get the Facts, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/secure_ 
communities/get-the-facts.htm [https://perma.cc/NV83-QVTB] (emphasis added). 
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automobile is stopped the officer can ask the occupants for 
identification and, finding none, she might have reasonable suspicion 
to believe they are in the country illegally. (Recall that reasonable 
suspicion requires only facts sufficient to suggest that a suspect 
might be involved in illegal activity.)113 This then obligates the 
officer (under Arizona and some other state laws) to investigate the 
immigration status of the suspicious individuals.114 Alternatively, the 
officer could simply arrest the driver for speeding and book him into 
custody knowing with certainty that the detainee’s immigration 
status would automatically be ascertained through the Secure 
Communities/PEP program.115 A similar result would obtain under 
the jail model 287(g) agreements in place in many jurisdictions: 
Incarceration triggers the authority of specially trained state and local 
officials to enforce federal immigration law in local jails.  
The relevant point is that the decision to stop, detain, or arrest 
in enforcement of “any other law” is not hermetically sealed from the 
decision to investigate a suspect for immigration violations. Faced 
with this combination of facts—a speeding car filled with Hispanic-
looking men in an area where large numbers of illegal Hispanic 
aliens reside—officials in states with immigration policing laws 
could plausibly believe they are required to stop such a vehicle.116
 113. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968). 
 114. Three caveats are in order here. First, the officers may have difficulty 
demonstrating reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as illegal presence may or 
may not be a criminal offense under the circumstances. Second, officers who 
extended the length of the stop to investigate immigration status without reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause of criminal activity could be found to have violated the 
Fourth Amendment. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. Third, if the investigation revealed 
merely a civil immigration violation, police would have no power to arrest the 
suspect on that ground. See supra notes 42-56, 65-72 and accompanying text.  
 115. At the scene of an arrest, police also have authority to search the 
arrestee’s automobile if the arrestee is within “grabbing distance” of the automobile 
or if police have reason to believe that there is evidence of the crime of arrest in the 
automobile. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. at 332, 351 (2009). Under these facts, 
police might be able to argue (although this is a stretch) that the lack of 
identification gives them reason to believe there may be further evidence of 
illegality in the automobile, such as documents or letters evidencing a foreign 
address.
 116. In a 2010 article, Kris Kobach, who drafted Arizona S.B. 1070, 
suggested that this precise set of facts might, itself, be enough to prompt a stop. 
Kobach, supra note 6 (“The most common situation in which S.B. 1070 will come 
into play is during a traffic stop. Suppose a police officer pulls over a minivan for 
speeding. He discovers that 16 people are crammed into the van and the seats have 
been removed. Neither the driver nor any of the passengers have any identification 
documents. The driver is acting evasively, and the vehicle is traveling on a known 
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Even in states without such laws, the existence of Secure 
Communities/PEP or a jail model 287(g) agreement provides 
incentives for police to take immigration suspects into custody in 
order to ensure investigation of possible immigration violations.  
The use of pretextual traffic stops is not merely speculative. It 
is well documented that police officers use stops and arrests for 
minor traffic offenses in precisely this way: as pretexts for 
investigating other, more serious criminal conduct. For example, 
police officers often wait for drivers to commit traffic offenses in 
order to look for drugs or investigate crimes for which they lack 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop.117
The key insight behind pretextual traffic stops is that arrests—
even arrests for minor traffic offenses—come with powerful 
investigative tools: Police who arrest for a simple traffic violation get 
an automatic search incident to arrest of the arrestee’s person and can 
seize evidence of crime in plain view in the automobile.118 They can 
search the passenger compartment if the arrestee is within “grabbing 
distance” of the automobile or if police have reason to believe that 
there is evidence of the crime of arrest in the automobile.119
Alternatively, they can do a Terry frisk of the automobile if there is 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is seeking to access a 
weapon.120 If any of these strategies turn up evidence of crime, police 
human-smuggling corridor. Courts have held that those four factors can give an 
officer reasonable suspicion to believe that the occupants are aliens unlawfully 
present in the United States.”). 
 117. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why 
“Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 311-18 (1999) (discussing 
techniques and case law enabling police to use traffic stops to investigate the car and 
driver). The facts at issue in the Fourth Amendment case, Arizona v. Gant, illustrate 
this strategy. Police were conducting a drug investigation focused on a particular 
residence. They observed Mr. Gant leaving the residence but they lacked probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion to detain him in connection with suspected drug 
dealing. Instead, they investigated Gant’s traffic record and found an outstanding 
warrant against him for driving without a license. When Gant returned in his 
automobile, police had probable cause—based on the outstanding traffic warrant—
to stop him and search his car for drugs. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
The Supreme Court held that the police can no longer do an automatic search 
incident to arrest of the car once the suspect has been removed from it. Id. at 350-51. 
 118. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). 
 119. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 350-51. Prior to the Court’s holding in Gant,
police officers got an automatic search incident to arrest of the arrestee’s vehicle 
even if the arrestee was sitting in handcuffs in the officer’s patrol car. See New York 
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). See generally Armacost, supra note 10. 
 120. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983). 
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could then have probable cause to search the entire automobile.121
Alternatively, the officers could seek consent to search the vehicle,122
which is virtually always granted by suspects. And if all else fails, 
police officers can arrest the driver, impound the automobile, and 
inventory the contents, which may uncover evidence of crime.123 In 
sum, police have strong incentives to leverage minor violations into 
broader investigative power. 
Involving state and local police in immigration enforcement 
creates similar incentives for them to use traffic and street stops as 
tools to investigate suspected illegal immigrants. Defenders argue 
that immigration policing does not permit police officers to stop or 
arrest for the purpose of checking immigration status. While this is 
technically true, once police have reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause to stop or arrest for a minor traffic or other offense, their actual 
motivation for the stop or arrest is irrelevant to the lawfulness of the 
stop.124 Even if motivation did matter, it would be difficult to 
determine (let alone prove) whether the officer stopped the speeding 
car and secondarily verified the occupants’ immigration status or she 
waited for a foreign-looking driver to commit a traffic offense in
order to check his immigration status. And no one but the officer 
herself knows which came first. This chicken-and-egg question is 
especially acute in jurisdictions where immigration verification is 
mandatory for all individuals who are lawfully stopped.125 In short, 
police officers can (and likely will) use minor offenses as pretexts to 
pursue suspected illegal immigrants. (Moreover, in places like 
Arizona—where the stated purpose of state immigration law is 
attrition by enforcement—police have strong political reasons for 
doing so.) 
More broadly, the nationwide inauguration of Secure 
Communities/PEP and the continued use of 287(g) jail model 
 121. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). 
 122. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
 123. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987); South Dakota 
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976). 
 124. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996). 
 125. For example, “Since 2008, the Phoenix Police Department (PPD) has 
directed its force to ask all lawfully-detained suspects about their immigration 
status.” Eagly, supra note 17, at 1182. According to the PPD, this policy saves the 
city money by transferring potential defendants to federal custody rather than 
booking them for a crime through the local system. Id. at 1183. See also Melendres 
v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 830 (D. Ariz. 2013) (Maricopa County Sheriff’s 
Deputy Rangel testified in civil rights trial that “it is possible to develop probable 
cause to stop just about any vehicle after following it for two minutes.”). 
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agreements also create strong incentives for pretextual stops and 
arrests. The knowledge that booking and jailing comes with 
automatic immigration verification encourages police to use traffic 
offenses to bring suspected illegal immigrants into the Secure 
Communities/PEP network. Incarceration also triggers 287(g) 
authority for specially trained prison officials to investigate 
suspected immigration violations, serve warrants of arrest, prepare 
charging documents, issue immigration detainers, detain arrested 
aliens subject to removal, and transport them to ICE-approved 
facilities. Especially in the current anti-immigrant climate, state and 
local police have strong incentives to use ordinary law enforcement 
actions to expose suspected illegal immigrants to federal 
immigration investigation.  
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the federal 
agency that administers federal–state partnerships such as Secure 
Communities/PEP and the 287(g) program, has acknowledged the 
significant risk that such collaborations might distort law 
enforcement decisions. In response, ICE has repeatedly affirmed its 
intention that state and local policing decisions should be made 
independently from immigration enforcement goals126 but has made 
little or no concrete efforts to enforce this intention. In language used 
to promote its collaborative programs, ICE explicitly encourages 
state and local officials to see themselves as part of the ICE “team” 
in addressing security challenges in their community.  
Public comments by police leaders confirm that they view 
programs like Secure Communities/PEP in precisely this way: as 
tools to amplify the breadth and power of ordinary policing.127 As a 
 126. ICE asserts that Secure Communities functions only after state and local 
officials have made “a completely independent decision . . . to arrest and book an 
individual for a criminal violation of state or local law separate and apart from any 
violations of immigration law.” JOHN MORTON, DIRECTOR, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: ICE RESPONSE TO THE TASK
FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ICE%20Response%20to%20Ta
sk%20Force%20on%20Secure%20Communities.pdf [perma.cc/53U5-FAV8]. 
 127. See, e.g., Ivan Moreno, Immigrant Groups Criticize Fingerprint 
Initiative, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 26, 2010, 5:04 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
id/38417091/ns/us_news-immigration_a_nation_divided/t/immigrant-groups-criticize-
fingerprint-initiative/#.U8_AGbHLJMY [https://perma.cc/35Q7-ETG3] (quoting Butler 
(Ohio) County Sheriff Rick Jones who praised the program as “heaven-sent” 
because “I don’t want [illegal alien criminals] in my community. I’ve got enough 
homegrown criminals here.”); Sheriff’s Office Partners with ICE to Launch Secure 
Communities Program, FAIRFAX CTY., VA. (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www. 
fairfaxcounty.gov/sheriff/news/ice.htm [https://perma.cc/NH6A-C3DX] (quoting 
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result, these programs have dramatically merged the lines between 
policing and immigration enforcement by inducing police to view 
them “simply as different kinds of tools, and to use whichever tool 
works best against a particular offender or suspect.”128 Indeed, it is 
common for “individuals [to be] shunted back and forth between the 
criminal justice system and the immigration enforcement system, or 
targeted by both simultaneously.”129 State and local officials have 
strong economic incentives to affirm the merged system: By turning 
illegal aliens directly over to immigration officials, they avoid the 
costs of criminal prosecution.130 Whether by design or default, state 
and local police have come to view immigration enforcement as 
simply another tool in the law enforcement arsenal.  
An empirical study of state and local immigration policing by 
Ingrid Eagly supports the claim that the promise of back-end 
immigration enforcement affects front-end law enforcement choices. 
In a study of three large urban jurisdictions—Los Angeles County, 
California; Harris County, Texas; and Maricopa County, Arizona—
Eagly concluded that “criminal law’s integration with immigration 
enforcement has a far more powerful impact on local criminal 
then-Sheriff Stan Barry of Fairfax County who called Secure Communities a “win-
win situation both for the community and law enforcement” because “[w]e will be 
able to identify illegal immigrants who commit crimes in Fairfax County and get 
them in the process for deportation, and it does not require additional funds or 
manpower from us.”). 
 128. Sklansky, supra note 15, at 202. 
 129. Id. A dramatic, earlier example of a program explicitly designed to 
substitute immigration enforcement for criminal prosecution was “Operation 
Community Shield.” Under this program state and local police would identify 
individuals suspected of being members of a criminal gang and turn their names 
over to ICE with the understanding that federal immigration officials would initiate 
deportation proceedings against them. The program was described by ICE as an 
effort “to use all our tools to disrupt and dismantle” criminal gangs. Kirk Semple, 
Gang Activity Now a Focus for Immigration Agents, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/nyregion/10gangs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/AYB3-YWUZ] (quoting James T. Hayes, Jr., Special Agent in 
Charge, Investigations Division, Immigration and Customs). 
 130. For example, since 2008, the Phoenix Police Department (“PPD”) has 
instructed its officers to question each lawfully detained individual about his or her 
immigration status. According to the PPD, one benefit of this practice is that 
immigration violators can be transported directly to federal authorities without 
booking them into their own local jails. After adopting this policy, the PPD reports 
that the number of jail bookings with immigration detainers has declined by 13%, 
saving the city expenses normally associated with booking and jailing. Eagly, supra
note 17, at 1182-83. 
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process than previously understood.”131 Her study demonstrates that 
law enforcement officials are “keenly aware of both the immigration 
status of defendants and the practical effects of the federal 
government’s reliance on convictions in making immigration-
enforcement decisions.”132 For example, defense attorneys in 
Maricopa County describe how police officers use traffic stops for 
minor violations to justify a stop and request for identification. Then, 
if a driver’s identification, either a driver’s license or a Mexican 
consular identification card, looks “suspicious,” the detainee is taken 
into local criminal custody on suspicion of document fraud, which 
exposes her to immigration verification.133
Maricopa Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s 287(g) operation was the 
consummate example of the instrumental use of traffic stops for 
immigration enforcement. Under Arpaio, the Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) conducted “saturation patrols” in which 
officers would conduct traffic enforcement operations for the explicit 
purpose of detecting unauthorized aliens during the course of the 
stops.134 In one type of saturation patrol, officers were instructed to 
“station themselves at locations where Latino day laborers 
assembled,” identify vehicles that would pick up day laborers, and 
follow the vehicles until the drivers committed minor traffic 
offenses.135 During saturation patrols, the MCSO kept statistics on 
how many unauthorized aliens had been arrested during the patrol, 
and after such patrols, MCSO issued press releases emphasizing that 
their purpose was immigration enforcement.136 Internal emails 
 131. Id. at 1134. 
 132. Id. Eagly based her conclusions on interviews with the whole range of 
state and local criminal justice officials (including “prosecutors, public defenders, 
private attorneys, judges, pretrial services officers, probation officers, and jail 
personnel”) as well as on local laws and procedures, court documents, criminal and 
immigration-enforcement statistics, and prosecution policies and training manuals. 
Id. at 1133-34.
 133. Id. at 1183. Similarly, in the trial of the federal civil rights suit against 
the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Arpaio testified, “[O]urs is an 
operation, whether it’s the state law or the federal, to go after illegals, not the crime 
first, that they happen to be illegals. . . . [Y]ou go after them and you lock them up.” 
Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 830-31 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
 134. Id. at 831. The court found that during day labor operations and other 
small-scale saturation operations, there was a high correlation between total stops 
and stops that resulted in immigration arrests. Id. at 834. 
 135. Id. at 831. 
 136. Id. at 840. 
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confirm that saturation patrols often followed citizen complaints 
about day laborers, illegal immigrants, or “Mexicans.”137
B.  What Is Wrong with Pretextual Immigration Stops? 
One response to all of this is to say “So what?” So what if state 
and local police are using traffic offenses and Terry stops 
strategically to investigate and ultimately prosecute illegal aliens? 
This strategy is no different from stopping and arresting traffic 
violators as a pretext to search for evidence of drugs, a practice the 
Supreme Court has deemed lawful under the Fourth Amendment.138
Using pretextual stops in the immigration context is no different. 
The argument that practices like these are tolerable (if not 
preferred) is similar to the defense of so-called “pretextual 
prosecutions.” It is common for federal prosecutors who suspect a 
criminal defendant of one crime to charge and convict him of an 
unrelated, less serious but more easily proven crime.139 Pretextual 
prosecutions are a common feature of our criminal justice system 
and are generally (although not universally) accepted as legally and 
ethically permissible.140 Prosecutors argue that they are targeting 
defendants who are, in fact, guilty of actual crimes for which any 
citizen could be prosecuted and punished.141 Why should the Al 
Capones of the world be immune from punishment for their small 
crimes simply because they have also committed larger crimes?142
Defendants who challenge their prosecutions on these grounds 
 137. Id. at 859. 
 138. The controlling case is Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), in 
which the Court deemed pretextual stops lawful under the Fourth Amendment if 
there is objective evidence of criminal activity, regardless of the actual motivation of 
police officers who carry them out. Even an invidious racial motivation does not 
render a search or seizure unlawful under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 813, and it 
may or may not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra notes 177-85 and 
accompanying text. 
 139. See generally Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s 
Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005).  
 140. See id. at 585. 
 141. See id. at 584. 
 142. As long as the subject is actually guilty of the underlying crime for 
which action has been taken and there is no allegation that she was singled out for 
invidious reasons, she cannot be heard to complain that she was treated unfairly. See 
id. at 584. 
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generally lose, unless they can prove racial (or other invidious) 
discrimination.143
Returning to the immigration context, identifying possible 
immigration violators by arresting them for traffic offenses is no 
more problematic than prosecuting Al Capone for tax evasion. Why 
should the speeder be immune from prosecution just because police 
also suspect her of being in the country illegally? Or, to flip the 
argument around, if not all illegal immigrants can be (or should be) 
investigated and prosecuted, doesn’t it make sense to target for 
police action those who have violated other laws? Federal 
immigration officials take the view that criminal misconduct serves 
as a good sorting mechanism in an immigration enforcement regime 
in which federal law is—either by design or default—underenforced. 
This intuition lies behind the enforcement priority that federal 
immigration authorities have placed on illegal immigrants who have 
engaged in (serious) criminal activity.144
Criminal justice scholar David Sklansky responds that 
pretextual prosecutions and pretextual immigration policing are 
problematic, not because they are unfair but because they 
compromise political accountability.145 Sklansky places these 
phenomena into a broader category he calls “ad hoc 
instrumentalism,” meaning law enforcement strategies that view the 
whole range of substantive law, procedure, and remedies as 
interchangeable tools to be employed strategically as the 
circumstances demand.146 Instrumentalist strategies start by 
 143. The leading case addressing the so-called “pretext” argument is Wayte
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). In Wayte, the defendant was one of some 
674,000 who illegally failed to register for the draft. Unlike the other draft-dodgers, 
however, he repeatedly wrote letters to the Justice Department announcing that he 
had not, and would not, register and daring them to prosecute him. See id. at 601 n.2, 
604. When he was prosecuted, the defendant objected that he was singled out for 
writing the letters. The Supreme Court rejected his argument. Id. at 607-10. See
generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.4(c) (3d ed. 
2007).
 144. See Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, 
and All Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil 
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, 
and Removal of Aliens 5 (June 17, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX7F-V4FV]. 
 145. See Sklansky, supra note 15, at 161. 
 146. Id. at 161. Sklansky links ad hoc instrumentalism with a broader 
phenomenon of legal instrumentalism involving the “decline of natural law, 
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identifying the subject (or suspect) to be targeted and then searching 
among various sources of law for legal options to investigate or 
prosecute her.147 In the immigration context, ad hoc instrumentalism 
means the pragmatic use of two formally separate sources of law and 
procedure—immigration law and criminal law—to target the same 
perceived threat: the criminal alien.148 On this view, immigration 
policing, like pretextual stops more generally, compromises our 
ability to hold law enforcers accountable for their conduct and 
policies.149
Political controls are effective only if the allocation of 
responsibility for decisions is clear and programmatic motivations 
for decisions are sufficiently transparent.150 The merging of policing 
and immigration enforcement—so-called crimmigration—has made 
it increasingly difficult to identify who is ultimately responsible for 
the decisions and enforcement priorities resulting from immigration 
policing.151 Under the collaborative federal–state programs at issue 
here, state and local officials are engaged in enforcing ordinary 
crimes at the same time they are investigating immigration 
violations. When they conduct a traffic stop or a Terry stop of a 
foreign-looking person, it may not be clear what actually motivated 
customary law, and legal formalism” and the “tendency to see law as instrumental 
and artificial.” See id. at 198. 
 147. Id. at 201. 
 148. Id. at 201-02. According to Sklansky, the general strategy of identifying 
a category of criminal actors—for example, gang-members or drug dealers—and 
then “pulling every lever” to get them off the streets is well known in the policing 
community. Id. at 203. He argues that so-called “pulling levers focused deterrence” 
originated from the problem-oriented policing movement and was piloted as part of 
the Boston Gun Project in the 1990s to address gang violence. Id. The approach was 
subsequently embraced by the U.S. Department of Justice as an effective method of 
crime prevention. Id. at 181. As a result, it has been employed in many American 
cities through federally sponsored violence prevention programs. In sum, the 
practice of identifying the troublemakers, gang-members, or suspected criminals and 
then finding some way to investigate and prosecute them is common in state and 
local law enforcement circles. 
 149. Id. at 214. 
 150. See generally Richman & Stuntz, supra note 139. For example, 
Richman and Stuntz argue that when a murder suspect is prosecuted for tax evasion 
even though the real law enforcement concern is the more serious crime, it deprives 
the public of information the prosecution would otherwise provide about the social 
meaning of its enforcement actions. Id. at 585-87. 
 151. The rise of immigrant groups and public interest organizations 
committed to immigration reform has enhanced political accountability in this area, 
but crimmigration has made it difficult to assign ultimate responsibility for the shape 
of immigration enforcement. Sklansky, supra note 15, at 213-15. 
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their actions: law enforcement or immigration enforcement. This 
muddies the social meaning of their policing actions, making it 
difficult for the public to monitor whether or not they are pursuing 
desired public safety (or immigration) priorities.152 Conversely, when 
federal officials deport large numbers of individuals who have been 
“fed” into the immigration enforcement system by state and local 
police, it is difficult to determine whether the universe of deportees 
was motivated by immigration goals or was largely path dependent, 
i.e., predetermined by criminal justice priorities.  
Political accountability is also compromised in another way by 
the merged systems of criminal justice and immigration law: When 
immigrants (both legal153 and illegal) are caught up in this 
overlapping legal regime, “it is difficult if not impossible to 
determine who is responsible for [their] treatment.”154 In the criminal 
justice system there are reasonably clear lines of responsibility: 
police, prosecutors, judges, juries, prison officials, and parole 
officers have distinct functions at precise points in the criminal 
process. For the most part at least, decisions made and actions taken 
within their spheres of responsibility can be traced back to them. The 
lines of responsibility for immigration decisions are reportedly less 
transparent,155 but until the advent of immigration policing, at least 
we knew which agency was responsible for immigration 
enforcement decisions. In the merged system, it may be difficult to 
determine at which point (and by whom) particular decisions were 
made, for example, whether to detain or investigate a suspected 
illegal alien, whether to transport or incarcerate her, whether to file a 
detainer, and whether to act on that detainer. Relatedly, it may be 
difficult to trace responsibility for establishing and executing 
enforcement priorities.156
A good example of the latter problem is determining 
responsibility for enforcement patterns that have resulted from the 
operation of Secure Communities/PEP. According to ICE, Secure 
Communities was launched primarily to enhance the ability of 
federal officials to find and deport noncitizens who have committed 
 152. See generally Richman & Stuntz, supra note 139. 
 153. There have been multiple stories of legal immigrants or even American-
born citizens being mistakenly caught up in the immigration net, sometimes with 
dramatic consequences before errors were caught and corrected. See, e.g., Sklansky, 
supra note 15, at 215-17. 
 154. See id. at 214. 
 155. Id. at 213-14. 
 156. Id. at 212-13. 
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serious crimes.157 Under the program, fingerprint records submitted 
to the FBI by state and local law enforcement agencies are passed on 
to ICE to be checked against DHS databases for evidence of 
immigration violations. If a match is found, that information is sent 
to the local ICE office, which has discretion to file “detainers” for 
those whom ICE wants the local organizations to hold and then turn 
over to it (or under PEP, whom ICE wants transferred to its custody). 
(In jurisdictions that have jail model 287(g) agreements, designated 
state and local officials are authorized to investigate possible 
immigration violations and issue detainers under the supervision and 
direction of ICE officials.158) Based on this framework, it is allegedly 
federal officials who establish and execute federal immigration 
priorities. State and local officials make upstream criminal justice 
decisions—who to detain or arrest under state or federal criminal law 
—but they have no independent role in determining the specific 
individuals who will be subject to immigration enforcement.159
In fact, the actual lines of responsibility for the shape of 
immigration enforcement under Secure Communities are much less 
clear. According to ICE, between 2008—when Secure Communities 
 157. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano 
and ICE Assistant Secretary Morton Announce that the Secure Communities 
Initiative Identified More Than 111,000 Criminal Aliens in Its First Year (Nov. 12, 
2009), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/11/12/secure-communities-initiative-identified-
more-111000-criminal-aliens-its-first-year [https://perma.cc/GY3U-D7AN]. 
 158. The model Memorandum of Agreement for current 287(g) jail model 
agreements states that “[t]he purpose of this collaboration” between state, local, and 
federal officials “is to enhance the safety and security of communities by focusing 
resources on identifying and processing for removal criminal aliens who pose a 
threat to public safety or a danger to the community.” MEMORANDUM OF 
AGREEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2016) https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
detention-reform/pdf/287g_moa.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VPM-VER5]. 
 159. In its early implementation, Secure Communities was explicitly 
described by federal officials as a “partnership” between ICE and federal, state, 
tribal, and local law enforcement. This language implied that law enforcement 
officials and immigration officials had joint responsibility for immigration 
enforcement actions. More recently, ICE has characterized Secure Communities as 
merely an “information-sharing partnership.” The current Department of Homeland 
Security web site emphasizes that:  
Under Secure Communities state and local law enforcement officers are 
not deputized, do not enforce immigration law, . . . only federal officers 
make immigration enforcement decisions, and they do so only after a 
completely independent decision by state and local law enforcement to 
arrest an individual for a criminal violation of state law separate and apart 
from any violations of immigration law.  
ICE, Secure Communities, supra note 112.  
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was launched by the George W. Bush administration—and April of 
2014 over 283,000 illegal aliens have been deported.160 ICE claims 
that Secure Communities operated pursuant to clear and 
commonsense priorities for removing those aliens with criminal 
convictions.161 According to ICE, this led to an 87% increase in the 
number of deportees with criminal convictions and a 29% decrease 
in the deportation of noncriminals.162 Critics respond that these 
claims are highly misleading: According to an analysis by the 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), ICE’s 
statistics mask the fact that many of the “criminal convictions” that 
led to deportation during this period were either traffic offenses or 
convictions for immigration offenses (typically illegal entry, a petty 
misdemeanor under federal law).163 Indeed, the number of deported 
immigrants whose most serious offense was listed as a traffic 
violation “quadrupled from 43,000 during the last five years of 
President George W. Bush’s administration to 193,000 during the 
five years [of the Obama administration].”164 This occurred in spite 
of the fact that beginning in 2010, just as Secure Communities was 
ramping up,165 former ICE director John Morton issued a series of 
directives instructing agency staff to focus their limited resources on 
deporting serious criminals, with the highest priority on noncitizens 
who posed a serious risk to public safety or endangered national 
security.166
 160. See Christi Parsons & Brian Bennett, Homeland Security May Reduce 
Deportations of Nonviolent Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2014, 6:12 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-secure-communities-20140525-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/SA6C-LHXA]. 
 161. ICE, Secure Communities, supra note 112. 
 162. See TRAC IMMIGRATION, supra note 86, tbl. 2. (reporting data for the 
period between October 2008—when Secure Communities was launched—and 
October 2011). 
 163. Based on ICE records obtained through a series of FOIA requests, 
TRAC reports that “the most serious charge for fully half of the total [deportations] 
was an immigration or traffic violation.” Id. ¶ 5; see also Thompson & Cohen, supra
note 88 (based on internal government records, NYT reported that between 2009 
and the date of reporting two-thirds of the nearly 2 million deportees had committed 
only minor infractions, such as traffic offenses, or had no criminal record at all). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Prior to 2010, very few jurisdictions were covered by Secure 
Communities. That year signaled a rapid expansion of the program, which was 
extended to virtually all jurisdictions by the end of fiscal year 2013. TRAC 
IMMIGRATION, supra note 86. 
 166. See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 144. 
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So what (and who) is responsible for this apparent turn from 
the “clear and commonsense” priority set by high-level ICE officials 
to target dangerous criminal aliens? It is not entirely clear. On the 
one hand, the crucial assumption, oft repeated by ICE, that state and 
local police will go about their business without regard to the 
promise of immigration verification is false for the reasons outlined 
above. This means that the detainee population that is ultimately 
subject to Secure Communities verification is itself determined by 
law enforcement actions that are tainted by pretextual stops and 
arrests designed to funnel criminal justice suspects (mostly minor 
offenders) into the immigration system. If so, the final mix of 
detainees subject to immigration detainers is partially path-
dependent, and state and local officials are, at least in part, 
responsible for setting immigration enforcement priorities.  
On the other hand, ICE officials have the final say over 
whether to take immigration enforcement actions against any 
particular detainee. It is ICE officials from Enforcement and 
Removal Operations (ERO) who “transport[] removable aliens from 
point to point, manage[] aliens in custody,” and remove from the 
United States individuals “who have been ordered to be deported.”167
So if significant numbers of aliens who have committed only minor 
crimes are being deported, the failure to meet publicly stated 
immigration priorities traces right back to ICE and its failure to 
monitor its own agents. Such monitoring is made more difficult by 
the reality that immigration enforcement is broadly dispersed, with 
on-the-ground authority falling to local ERO field office personnel. 
Many local ERO agents have resisted the imposition of “formalized 
prosecutorial discretion” by high-level ICE officials seeking to 
channel federal immigration priorities.168 Moreover, even if local 
ERO officials are willing and ready to follow centralized 
instructions, it takes time to get detailed guidance and training in 
place. Thus another explanation for the gap between stated federal 
immigration priorities and actual deportation numbers involves a 
principle–agent problem within ICE itself.  
But there is a third possible reason why so many low-level 
offenders have been the subject of enforcement action. Although the 
 167. ICE, Enforcement and Removal Operations, http://www.ice.gov/about/ 
offices/enforcement-removal-operations/ [https://perma.cc/F6RQ-Y7CQ] (last visited 
Dec. 12, 2016). 
 168. I am indebted to my colleague Professor David Martin for this point. 
Professor Martin served as Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department of 
Homeland Security from January 2009 to December 2010. 
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immigration advocacy community routinely tries to portray federal 
priorities as allowing removal only of serious offenders, that is not 
how the ICE priority directives actually read. Some individuals who 
have committed low-level criminal violations are within the 
priorities, not primarily because of their criminal offenses but 
because they fit other criteria ICE has laid out for enforcement 
action. While ICE has set its highest priority on aliens who have 
committed serious crimes, its second and third priorities are recent 
border crossers and re-entrants (after removal) or fugitives who did 
not honor a removal order.169 ICE’s press releases, which have tended 
to emphasize the focus on deportation of dangerous criminals, have 
fed into the misunderstanding that only serious criminal offenders 
will be targeted for deportation. In its claim that Secure Communities 
targets petty criminals and traffic offenders, TRAC has been careless 
(or misleading) in not recognizing that some illegal immigrants who 
have committed only minor crimes have been deported on other 
grounds that do satisfy publicly stated priorities. These mistakes 
have been picked up and repeated by immigration advocacy 
groups.170 In sum, it may be that Secure Communities is, in fact, 
targeting exactly the population of illegal immigrants identified by 
high-level ICE officials.  
The confusion about who is responsible for the shape of 
enforcement under Secure Communities/PEP and whether the 
program is meeting its publicly stated goals is an example of how ad 
hoc instrumentalism can undermine political accountability.171 The 
confusion results from the merged systems of criminal and 
immigration enforcement and the strategy of using the two 
instrumentally, as interchangeable tools of enforcement against an 
identified class of individuals in which both systems have an interest. 
Supporters of immigration policing in its various forms—state 
immigration legislation, 287(g) agreements, Secure Communities—
have touted its benefits, particularly the fact that these programs 
serve as “force multipliers” to federal immigration enforcement. 
These benefits must be balanced, however, against the costs, one of 
which is a significant loss of political accountability that occurs 
 169. The memorandum from John Morton sets three priorities. See generally
Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 144, at 4-5. 
 170. See David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just for 
Restrictionists: Building a Stable and Efficient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 
J.L. & POL. 411, 448 (2015). 
 171. See Sklansky, supra note 15, at 161. 
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when the two systems of criminal justice and immigration law are 
merged. 
C. The Problem of Racial Profiling 
More troubling than pretextual stops and arrests, however, is 
that immigration policing leads almost unavoidably to racial 
profiling. By the term racial profiling I mean any investigative or 
prosecutorial action taken by police against an individual based on 
the assumption that individuals of his or her particular race or 
ethnicity are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than persons 
of other races or ethnicities.172 Recall my example of the five 
Hispanic men stopped for going 45 mph in a 40 mph zone. It seems 
clear that if they had been five white males in a vehicle going 45 
mph, they would not have been stopped merely for speeding. 
Moreover, the only reason to suspect them of being illegal aliens is 
the color of their skin. Race by itself, however, is not a good proxy 
for illegal presence, especially where it is most often used as an 
indication of illegal presence, namely in parts of the country with 
large immigrant populations. While it might be true that in some 
areas of the country, for example near our southern border, a 
Hispanic person is more likely than a white person to be an illegal 
alien, it does not follow that most Hispanic individuals in those areas 
are illegal aliens.173 But programs like Secure Communities/PEP and 
287(g), as well as state immigration policing laws, create strong 
incentives for police to stop or arrest foreign-looking individuals for 
minor offenses in order to funnel them into the immigration 
verification system.  
In response to concerns about racial profiling, supporters of 
immigration policing emphasize that state immigration laws 
 172. I have borrowed this definition from Samuel R. Gross & Debra 
Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002) 
(“As we use the term, ‘racial profiling’ occurs whenever a law enforcement officer 
questions, stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the 
officer believes that members of that person’s racial or ethnic group are more likely 
than the population at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is 
investigating.”). 
 173. According to a recent report, less than half of Hispanics in the United 
States—35.5%—were born in another country. See JENS MANUEL KROGSTAD, MARK
HUGO LOPEZ & MOLLY ROHAL, PEW RESEARCH CTR., HISPANIC NATIVITY SHIFT:
U.S. BIRTHS DRIVE POPULATION GROWTH AS IMMIGRATION STALLS 3 (2014), http:// 
www.pewhispanic.org/files/2014/04/2014-04_hispanic-nativity-shift.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/AB35-M2UQ]. 
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expressly prohibit racial profiling by forbidding the use of “race, 
color or national origin . . . except to the extent permitted by the 
United States . . . Constitution.”174 Agreements under 287(g) have 
similar prohibitions on racial profiling.175 It turns out, however, that 
quite a bit of racial profiling is legal under the U.S. Constitution. In 
particular, police officers who target foreign-looking individuals for 
traffic stops or Terry stops as a pretext for immigration enforcement 
will be engaged in racial profiling that is either perfectly legal (albeit 
controversial) or very, very difficult to litigate.  
Consider again my speeding car hypothetical. Suppose the 
police officer admits that he would not have pulled the automobile 
over except that he suspected the occupants were illegal aliens 
because they “looked foreign.” Given that most of the 350,000 
illegal aliens in the state of Arizona are Hispanic,176 we should expect 
that police officers who view themselves as partners in the pursuit of 
illegal immigrants will target individuals from this ethnic group. For 
all practical purposes, such targeting is constitutionally permissible 
as long as it is “hidden” behind an otherwise legitimate stop.  
First, there would be no claim under the Fourth Amendment. In
Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a police 
officer’s actual motive—racial or otherwise—is irrelevant to the 
lawfulness of a search or seizure as long as it is supported by 
 174. 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 113 (S.B. 1070) § 2 (West), amended by
2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 211 (H.B. 2162) § 3 (West) (codified at ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010)); 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 113 (S.B. 1070) § 3 
(West), amended by H.B. 2162 § 4 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(C) 
(2010)); ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(c) (LexisNexis 2011) (“A law enforcement officer 
shall not attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is 
lawfully present in the United States. A law enforcement officer may not consider 
race, color, or national origin in implementing the requirements of this section 
except to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution or the Constitution 
of Alabama of 1901.”). 
 175. See, e.g., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 158, at 1, 8. 
(“Participating [name of state LEA] personnel are bound by all Federal civil rights 
laws, regulations, guidance relating to non-discrimination, including U.S. 
Department of Justice ‘Guidance Regarding The Use Of Race By Federal Law 
Enforcement Agencies’ dated June 2003 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., which prohibits discrimination based 
upon race, color, or national origin (including limited English proficiency) in any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
 176. BRYAN BAKER & NANCY RYTINA, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED 
STATES: JANUARY 2012, Table 4 at 5 (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/ois_ill_pe_2012_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/26A5-TEBE].  
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objective evidence (e.g., probable cause) of illegal activity.177
Second, while the defendants in Whren could theoretically have 
raised claims of racial animus under the Equal Protection Clause,178
such claims are difficult to bring and even more difficult to win.179
To pursue a discriminatory enforcement claim—which would be 
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983—plaintiffs must prove both 
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.180 Plaintiffs generally 
try to meet this burden by offering evidence that police officers 
disproportionately stopped or arrested individuals from the plaintiff’s 
racial or ethnic group. This requires that the plaintiff offer data about 
not only his or her own stop or arrest but also the stops or arrests of 
other, similarly situated individuals. In addition to the heavy 
evidentiary burden such a showing entails—and the fact that the 
necessary evidence is in the hands of the police department—the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Armstrong181 made it almost 
impossible for plaintiffs to obtain discovery of the factual 
information necessary to prove intent in discriminatory enforcement 
cases. Moreover, even if successful, § 1983 suits in this context are 
unlikely to result in large damages recoveries, although the 
availability of attorneys’ fees may mitigate this limitation to some 
degree182
 177. 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996). In Whren, police allegedly stopped a driver 
for failing to signal a right turn. Id. at 808. The suspects claimed that the actual 
motivations for the stop were that they were African American and police officers 
suspected them of drug dealing (a crime for which police did not have probable 
cause to stop). Id. at 809-10. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding 
that motive was irrelevant to the lawfulness of the stop. Id. at 812.  
 178. See id. at 813 (pointing defendants to the Equal Protection Clause as 
source of relief for allegations of racial animus in policing). 
 179. While multiple scholars have made this point, one of the clearest 
accounts is found in Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal 
Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2004 (1998). 
 180. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S 229, 235, 239-40, 248 (1976) 
(holding that discriminatory intent has to be proven in an equal protection challenge 
to a facially neutral employment policy). 
 181. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (holding that 
defendants must show that the government failed to prosecute similarly situated 
suspects of other races in order to file selective-prosecution claims). The Court 
denied the plaintiffs’ discovery request in Armstrong, despite persuasive evidence of 
racial bias in enforcement of crack cocaine laws and despite defendants’ showing 
that all crack cocaine defendants arrested in the same jurisdiction were black. Id. at 
470. See also David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1283, 1283 (1995). 
 182. By diverting claims of racial animus from the Fourth Amendment to the 
Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has also eliminated the best remedy 
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Third, in the immigration context some intentional, race-
conscious actions by law enforcement officials are lawful under the 
Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. In United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court held that officers may 
explicitly cite the race of the suspect in making out reasonable 
suspicion for immigration-oriented stops near the U.S. border if race 
is “relevant” to the question of whether the individual was in the 
country illegally.183 In Brignoni-Ponce, roving border patrol agents 
stopped a vehicle near the Mexican border and questioned its 
occupants about their immigration status based only on suspicion that 
the occupants appeared to be of Mexican ancestry. The Court upheld 
the stop, reasoning that an officer “is entitled to assess the facts in 
light of his experience in detecting illegal entry and smuggling” 
including his experience in “recogniz[ing] the characteristic 
appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as 
the mode of dress and haircut.”184 Importantly, if race is “relevant” to 
the Fourth Amendment question, then there is also no review under 
the Equal Protection Clause. By embracing the government’s 
argument that “trained officers can recognize the characteristic 
appearance of persons who live in Mexico” and can use alleged 
Mexican appearance to make immigration stops, the Court has 
available for combating racially motivated searches and seizures, the exclusion of 
the evidence in any criminal case against the claimant. See Karlan, supra note 179, 
at 2004. 
 183. 422 U.S. 873, 881, 885, 887 (1975) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)). If race is relevant to the Fourth 
Amendment question, then there is no review under the Equal Protection Clause. See 
also Bernard E. Harcourt, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte: The Road to Racial Profiling, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES
318 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). In addition to race, other factors cited by the court 
as relevant to the showing of reasonable suspicion include: the characteristics of the 
area in which they encounter the vehicle (its location, proximity to the border, usual 
patterns of traffic); officers’ previous experience with illegal border crossings; the 
suspects’ behavior (erratic driving, obvious attempts to evade the officers); and 
aspects of vehicle itself (fold down seats, compartments that could hide aliens, 
heavy load, extraordinary number of passengers). Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-
85.
 184. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885. Federal law authorizes federal agents, 
without a warrant: 
‘within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United
States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial 
waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance or 
vehicle . . .’ Under [then-]current regulations, this authority could be 
exercised anywhere within 100 miles of the border.  
Id. at 877 (quoting 8 CFR § 287.1(a) (1975)). 
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explicitly embraced the use of racial profiling in immigration 
policing.185 The Court so held despite that even in areas with large 
concentrations of individuals with the physical characteristics of 
Mexican ancestry, a relatively small proportion of them are illegal 
aliens.186 In other words, “Mexican appearance” is not, in fact, a good 
proxy for illegal presence.187
In light of the facts that police officers are more likely to 
suspect “foreign-looking” people of illegal presence, that some uses 
of race in immigration stops are legal, and that unlawful uses of race 
are hard to litigate, it is not surprising that allegations of racial 
profiling have plagued immigration policing programs. There were 
widespread claims of racial profiling in jurisdictions with 287(g) task 
force programs, where state and local officials were authorized to 
 185. Harcourt, supra note 183, at 328. As Kevin Johnson has argued, the 
very idea of a “Mexican appearance” is itself problematic. There is no one 
“phenotype” of people who are from Mexico; their coloring ranges from dark to fair. 
In any event, people are notoriously poor at identifying ethnic differences correctly. 
See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the 
Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for 
Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1025-26 (2010). The Court’s 
estimate that “85% of the aliens illegally in the country are from Mexico” was (and 
is) wildly inaccurate, the number being closer to 50%. Id. (quoting Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 879). 
 186. The Supreme Court itself recognized this difficulty in Brignoni-Ponce.
422 U.S. at 886. The Supreme Court continued in the same direction, however, in 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (holding that referrals to 
secondary inspection at fixed checkpoints “made largely on the basis of apparent 
Mexican ancestry” do not violate the U.S. Constitution). 
 187. The Ninth Circuit recognized this in United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 889 
(2000) (rejecting use of race because “[t]he likelihood that in an area in which the 
majority—or even a substantial part—of the population is Hispanic, any given 
person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone an illegal alien, is not high 
enough to make Hispanic appearance a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion 
calculus”). In Montero-Camargo, the court concluded that under the circumstances, 
race was not probative of illegality and “must be disregarded as a matter of law.” Id.
The court also emphasized that racial profiling is socially harmful: “Stops based on 
race or ethnic appearance send the underlying message . . . that those who are not 
white are judged by the color of their skin alone” and that they “enjoy a lesser 
degree of constitutional protection—that they are in effect assumed to be potential 
criminals first and individuals second.” Id. at 1135. But see United States v. Manzo-
Juardo, 457 F.3d 928, 935 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “Hispanic appearance” 
could be used as one factor supporting an immigration stop near the Canadian 
border in Havre, Montana, which is “sparsely populated with Hispanics”). The 
court’s reasoning in Manzo-Juardo is deeply flawed: That Havre, Montana, has few 
Hispanics is no reason to think that the few who are there—especially near a border 
with a non-Hispanic country—are illegal aliens. 
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carry out specified immigration enforcement duties in the field.188 In 
its 2010 report on the 287(g) program, the Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG) identified as a major concern that communities 
subject to 287(g) enforcement had reported racial discrimination and 
intimidation by law enforcement agency participants.189 The OIG 
reported that civil rights lawsuits had been filed against three 
jurisdictions; one was ongoing and two had been settled when police 
departments agreed to collect extensive data on police conduct 
during traffic stops and adopt strong policies against racial 
profiling.190 Multiple immigrant advocacy groups have also written 
reports identifying patterns of racial profiling in 287(g) 
jurisdictions.191 While many of these discrimination allegations 
involved 287(g) task force model programs, the still ongoing jail 
model 287(g) program has not escaped criticism: For example, a 
study of stops and arrests in connection with a 287(g) jail model 
program in Davidson County, Tennessee, led to the conclusion that 
police officers were targeting foreign-looking drivers for traffic stops 
in order to funnel them into the criminal justice system.192
 188. The 287(g) task force model program was terminated by ICE in 
December 2010. See supra notes 160-76 and accompanying text. 
 189. See 2010 OIG REPORT, supra note 37, at 23. 
 190. See id. The OIG Report did not give the names of the 287(g) 
jurisdictions subject to civil rights lawsuits. The DHS was a defendant in an 
additional lawsuit in connection with another law enforcement agency. Id. In its 
report, the OIG also faulted ICE for failing to screen its potential 287(g) partners for 
past civil rights violations and for failing to maintain policing data on current agency 
enforcement action that would screen for racial profiling and pretextual arrests. See 
id. at 26-27. 
 191. See, e.g., Azadeh Shahshahani, The Persistence of Racial Profiling in 
Gwinnett: Time for Accountability, Transparency, and an End to 287(g), ACLU OF GA.
1, 6, 8, 26 (Mar. 2010), https://www.acluga.org/sites/default/files/gwinnett_racial_ 
profiling_report_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TLY-9CHF]; see also, e.g., Deborah M. 
Weissman, Rebecca C. Headen & Katherine Lewis Parker, The Policies and Politics of 
Local Immigration Enforcement Laws: 287(g) Program in North Carolina, ACLU OF 
N.C. LEGAL FOUND. 1, 8, 10, 54 (Feb. 2009), http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/ 
clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDS4-KHNQ]; The 287(g) 
Program: A Flawed and Obsolete Method of Immigration Enforcement, AM.
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/ 
287g-program-flawed-and-obsolete-method-immigration-enforcement [https://perma.cc/ 
7MV9-E6QA]; Under Siege: Life for Low-Income Latinos in the South, SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW CTR. 1, 16, 20 (Apr. 2009), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/
d6_legacy_files/downloads/UnderSiege.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8GA-X42Z]. 
 192. See Lindsay Kee, Consequences & Costs: Lessons Learned from 
Davidson County, Tennessee’s Jail Model 287(g) Program, ACLU OF TENN. 1, 3-4,
11-12 (Dec. 2012), http://www.aclu-tn.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/287gF.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6X23-HMLZ]. 
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Perhaps the most notorious allegations of racial profiling in 
connection with immigration policing arose in connection with a 
287(g) agreement with the Maricopa County (Arizona) Sheriff’s 
Office (MCSO). Allegations of racial discrimination resulted in the 
filing of a civil rights suit against the County and Sheriff Arpaio193
and an adverse judgment in federal court.194 The court found that the 
MCSO was routinely conducting “saturation patrols,” in which they 
allegedly applied a “zero tolerance policy” for traffic violations195 but 
in practice targeted Hispanic individuals who had violated minor 
traffic laws. The court concluded that Arpaio and his deputies had 
relied on racial profiling and illegal detentions to target Latinos, 
using their foreign appearance as the main basis for suspecting them 
of being in the country illegally.196 Many of the targeted individuals 
were American citizens or legal residents.197 Arpaio’s flouting of 
 193. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Mr. Bill Montgomery, County Att’y, Maricopa Cty. 
(Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/15/mcso_ 
findletter_12-15-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5W8-VQSJ]. The investigation focused on 
the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office compliance with the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, and Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7. See id. 
 194. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1255, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 
2015); see also Melendres v. Arpaiao, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827, 895, 907, 910 (D. 
Ariz. 2013). See also Andrew Cohen, Federal Judge Chronicles Lawlessness of Joe 
Arpaio-Led Sheriff’s Office, THE ATLANTIC (May 25, 2013), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/national/archive/2013/05/federal-judge-chronicles-lawlessness-of-joe-arpaio-led-
sheriffs-office/276150/ [https://perma.cc/T67U-TWHL]; Fernanda Santos, Judge Finds 
Violations of Rights by Sheriff, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/05/25/us/federal-judge-finds-violations-of-rights-by-sheriff-joe-arpaio.html 
[https://perma.cc/52VJ-D386]. 
 195. See Melendres, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 861. As MCSO officers later testified 
at trial in the civil rights case against the department, a zero tolerance policy would 
be “impossible” to administer because “if you follow any vehicle on the roads . . . 
for even a short amount of time, you will be able to pull that person over for some 
kind of violation.” Id. at 860-61. The court concluded that, in fact, MCSO officers 
had followed no such policy but instead had targeted for stops and arrests 
individuals with Hispanic appearance and Hispanic sounding names. See id. at 863-
69, 905.  
 196. See id. at 905. MCSO officers and deputies testified at trial that their 
ICE 287(g) training allowed for the consideration of race as a factor in making 
immigration law enforcement decisions. Id. at 825. For example, officers testified 
that race could be used as “one factor among many in stopping a vehicle.” Id. at 846. 
The officers testified that the use of race as one factor was not “racial profiling,” 
which was forbidden (although no definition of racial profiling was provided). Id. at 
841.
 197. On appeal the 9th Circuit found some provisions of the permanent 
injunction issued against MCSO to be overbroad and vacated and remanded those 
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federal law and immigration policies resulted in a revocation of the 
287(g) agreement with the MCSO198 and ultimately with all law 
enforcement agencies in the state. 
Accusations of racial discrimination have also been raised in 
connection with the long-established Criminal Alien Program, a 
federal–state partnership in which “local jail officials hold people in 
jail until ICE can screen arrestees and issue a detainer” in appropriate 
cases.199 Similarly, a study analyzing arrests under Secure 
Communities, now PEP, also found evidence of racial profiling in 
connection with pretextual stops and arrests in anticipation of 
immigration verification.200
The bottom line is that state immigration policing statutes and 
state–federal immigration partnerships that funnel criminal aliens 
into the immigration system both permit and encourage racial 
profiling. And, more importantly, such profiling is either completely 
legal or very difficult to challenge in court. 
III. THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM
The negative consequences of immigration federalism have led 
to a backlash of resistance by state and local officials: Many states 
and localities withdrew from participation in Secure Communities 
provisions to the district court. See Melendres, 784 F.3d at 1264-65. The court did 
not overturn the holding of constitutional violations by the MCSO. Id. at 1267. 
Further, in May of 2016, the District Court for the District of Arizona found Sheriff 
Arpaio and others in civil contempt for failure to comply with the previous 
preliminary injunction in the case. Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-
GMS, 2016 WL 2783715 (D. Ariz., May 31, 2016). In August, the court referred the 
Sheriff for a determination of whether he should be held in criminal contempt. See 
Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 4414755, at *17 (D. 
Ariz., Aug. 19, 2016).  
 198. The 287(g) agreement with Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office was 
revoked on October 16, 2009. See Melendres, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 843. Sheriff Arpaio 
claimed that MCSO officers retained authority to enforce federal immigration law 
despite the revocation and he continued to conduct saturation patrols. That claim 
was apparently based on erroneous legal research that had been conducted by a 
police sergeant in the MCSO. Id.
 199. See TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL
WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL 
PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1, 8 (2009); see also ANDREA 
GUTTIN, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR., THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM: IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT IN TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 3-4, 16 (2010). 
 200. See AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & LISA CHAVEZ, THE CHIEF
JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON L. & SOC. POL’Y, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE 
NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS (2011). 
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and many have declined to participate in ICE’s new PEP program.201
Close to 300 states and localities have adopted laws or policies that 
prohibit officials from honoring federal immigration detainers or that 
limit the circumstances under which officials will honor them.202 Still 
other states and localities have brought successful statutory or 
constitutional challenges to federal detainers in court.  
These resistance efforts have often been called “sanctuary 
policies,” suggesting that their primary goal is to shelter illegal 
immigrants from federal immigration enforcement. For example, 
when Kathryn Steinle was murdered by an illegal immigrant in the 
so-called “sanctuary city” of San Francisco, many people blamed the 
tragedy on the city’s failure to cooperate with federal immigration 
officials.203 In fact, the term “sanctuary” as applied to these modern 
resistance efforts is a misnomer. The concept of a “sanctuary city” 
has American historical roots in 1980s efforts by churches to shelter 
immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua who fled 
their countries’ civil wars and illegally entered the United States 
across the Mexican border.204 These early policies differed from 
 201. See, e.g., Aguilar, supra note 92.  
 202. Griffith & Vaughan, supra note 2. Some estimates are as high as 500 
jurisdictions. See Sanburn, supra note 2. 
 203. See Lee Romney, Cindy Chang & Joel Rubin, Fatal Shooting of S.F. 
Woman Reveals Disconnect Between ICE, Local Police; 5-time Deportee Charged,
L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2015, 10:39 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-sf-
shooting-20150707-story.html [https://perma.cc/6NQK-RLL8]. Prior to his release in 
San Francisco, Lopez-Sanchez was serving time in federal prison for felony criminal 
reentry (i.e., for the crime of entering after having been deported), the third time he 
had served time for this crime. See id. ICE officials filed a detainer with the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, but instead of holding him, federal officials shipped him off to 
San Francisco to answer for a 20-year-old felony charge for selling marijuana.
(Lopez-Sanchez had six prior (non-violent) drug convictions, all in the 1990s.) 
When the district attorney determined that the marijuana case was too old to pursue, 
charges were dropped and Lopez-Sanchez was released. See id. ICE spokesperson 
Virginia Kice said in a statement that local officials ignored a detainer filed by ICE 
requesting that immigration officials be notified prior to releasing Lopez-Sanchez. 
Id. With the benefit of hindsight, Lopez-Sanchez’s release was a tragic mistake, but 
it cannot be attributed to a policy designed to shelter dangerous criminals. While 
Lopez-Sanchez probably should not have been released under then-current federal 
immigration priorities, his criminal history did not suggest he would turn violent. 
 204. See Davidson, supra note 103, at 602. The sanctuary movement of this 
period was led by churches and religious groups. See id. at 603. At its peak, the 
movement involved “over 300 churches serving as sanctuaries, with as many as 
2,000 additional churches providing logistical support.” See id. Some religious 
groups opposed the sanctuary movement, including conservative leaders in the 
Catholic Church and the national Association of Evangelicals. See id. at 604. The 
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modern resistance policies in two important ways. First, the 1980s 
sanctuary movement involved civil disobedience against existing law 
by private citizens.205 Second, the only and explicit goal of the 
movement was to thwart the enforcement of federal immigration law 
in order to keep citizens from being sent back to dangerous 
countries.
By contrast, current so-called sanctuary policies involve state 
and local officials acting pursuant to duly enacted laws and 
ordinances. Moreover, these policies are not designed primarily to 
obstruct all federal immigration enforcement. Rather, they are 
designed to get states and localities out of the business of frontline 
immigration enforcement. They are targeted to address the 
distortions that result from immigration federalism, namely the 
deportation of minor offenders, the increased incidence of racial 
profiling, and the resulting compromise of public safety.206
Viewed this way, state and local resistance policies represent a 
“new immigration federalism:” a principled rejection of one option 
for state immigration policy and the embrace of another. States and 
localities that have declined to cooperate in immigration policing are 
doing so for reasons that touch on immigrant issues in which they 
have a legitimate interest. Many state and local police departments 
complain that associating ordinary policing so closely with 
immigration enforcement—especially when it involves racial 
profiling and targets minor offenders—undermines trust between the 
police and immigrant communities.207 According to police experts, 
this makes victims, witnesses, and other residents unwilling to report 
idea of providing sanctuary to aliens and even criminals has much older religious 
and cultural roots, going all the way back to ancient times. See id. at 609. 
 205. See id. at 605-07. The federal government actively opposed the 
sanctuary movement, conducting surveillance operations and arresting, jailing, and 
convicting some for violations of immigration law. See id. at 605-06. In the largest 
federal operation against the sanctuary movement, eight defendants were convicted 
but eventually received suspended sentences and probation after a groundswell of 
public protest and support for leniency. See id. at 606-07. 
 206. See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 17, at 1157 (describing the Los Angeles 
resistance model as one in which “criminal justice actors endeavor to make 
decisions that limit the potential effects of immigration status and enforcement on 
criminal adjudication”). 
 207. See, e.g., MORTON, PROTECTING THE HOMELAND, supra note 126, at 14-
15. See also California Trust Act, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4651 § 1(d) (“The Secure 
Communities program and immigration detainers harm community policing efforts 
because immigrant residents who are victims of or witnesses to crime, including 
domestic violence, are less likely to report crime or cooperate with law enforcement 
when any contact with law enforcement could result in deportation.”). 
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crime or approach police to exchange information, which 
significantly undermines community policing. The ultimate results 
are community unrest, increased levels of crime, and a decrease in 
public safety.208 State and local officials explicitly identify these 
problems as reasons for their immigration resistance policies. Their 
position is strengthened by the Supreme Court’s strong affirmation 
that states have a strong and continuing interest in the health and 
safety of their immigrant communities.209
Seeing state and local resistance policies as a federalist 
response to the pathologies of immigration policing puts these 
policies into a different and more fruitful light. While states 
imposing policies of unilateral noncooperation may not be optimal in 
form, the substantive policies themselves offer valuable lessons for 
successful immigration federalism. Moreover, that ICE has begun to 
change some of its policies in response to state resistance suggests 
that federal immigration officials are listening. 
A. A New Federalist Response to Immigration Policing 
It should be clear by now that state and local immigration 
policing is governed not only by federal law but by Fourth 
Amendment law. Immigration policing takes place through the 
mechanism of stops and arrests for ordinary crimes. And the rules 
that determine when a person may be stopped, arrested, or 
investigated in connection with suspected criminal conduct are 
determined in the first instance by constitutional rules of search and 
seizure, and secondarily, by state definitions of what constitutes a 
crime.  
As a result, immigration policing and ordinary law enforcement 
share an important and problematic feature: In both contexts, police 
officers use stops and arrests for minor crimes as pretexts for 
investigating other violations for which they lack probable cause. 
The only thing that differs is the downstream benefit sought to be 
gained, in the one case investigation of ordinary crimes and in the 
other investigation of suspected immigration violations. For the 
reasons outlined in Part II, the pretextual use of stops and arrests in 
 208. See MORTON, PROTECTING THE HOMELAND, supra note 126, at 24. 
 209. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that while the federal 
government has primary authority over immigration regulation, states and localities 
have a legitimate interest in the health and safety of immigrants in their jurisdictions. 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012). 
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each of these contexts has serious negative repercussions, especially 
for racial minority communities.  
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence tells us that there are three 
basic factors that drive pretextual stops and arrests. Understanding 
these causes is the key to addressing pretextual immigration policing. 
The first factor is that state law, which governs the power to stop or 
arrest, criminalizes a broad range of minor street crimes and traffic 
offenses. This gives police broad discretion to use minor offenses to 
stop, investigate, or arrest individuals they suspect are illegal 
aliens.210 Second, pretextual stops and arrests for minor crimes are 
attractive because of the capacious investigative authority that 
follows from them, including the promise of immigration 
investigation.211 Third, even if police are acting pretextually—
stopping or arresting minor offenders to trigger immigration 
enforcement—their actions are lawful if they have probable cause 
under the Fourth Amendment.212
This jurisprudence in turn suggests three possible strategies for 
eliminating or reducing the use of pretextual stops and arrests in 
immigration policing. The first would be to limit warrantless arrests 
for minor crimes under the Fourth Amendment. This solution was 
foreclosed by Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,213 where the Supreme 
 210. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) 
(upholding warrantless arrests for minor offenses, including nonjailable offenses). 
 211. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text. With the exception of 
automobile searches, the Supreme Court has declined to limit under the Fourth 
Amendment the investigative perks that come with arrests for minor crimes. See,
e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that police may conduct a 
search incident to arrest of the grabbing area of a suspect); see also Florence v. Bd. 
of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (upholding strip search of arrestee 
for minor crime who is detained in the general prison population); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that arrest for a traffic offense permits full 
search incident to arrest of the person, including searching pockets and opening 
containers). The one exception is the Court’s opinion in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332 (2009), which held that police may do a search incident to arrest of an 
automobile only if they have reason to believe there is evidence of the crime of 
arrest in the automobile (or the arrestee is within grabbing distance of the 
automobile, which virtually never occurs because arrestees are virtually always 
handcuffed and placed in the patrol car). The holding in Gant essentially eliminates 
searches incident to arrest following arrest for minor traffic offenses. 
 212. See United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). As noted earlier, 
stops or arrests based on invidious motives such as racial discrimination 
theoretically can be challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, but such suits are 
difficult to bring and difficult to win. 
 213. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 318. In Atwater the defendant challenged her 
warrantless arrest and jailing for failing to wear a seatbelt. One of the concerns 
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Court upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge warrantless 
arrests for minor offenses (committed in the officer’s presence) if 
defined as crimes by state law. A second solution would be to 
decouple ordinary stops and arrests (especially for minor crimes) 
from the promise of immigration enforcement, a strategy reflected in 
many state resistance policies. A third possible solution would be to 
attack pretext directly by monitoring actual motivations for police 
actions. This solution, which is also designed to address racial 
profiling, has been adopted as part of some state and local policies. It 
holds less promise, however, for reasons I explain in the next 
Section.
B. Addressing Pretextual Policing 
The most important cause of pretextual policing is that stops 
and arrests for minor crimes come with the promise of immigration 
enforcement. One solution is to break or weaken the connection 
between policing and immigration enforcement. This undermines the 
incentives for police officers to make law enforcement decisions 
motivated by the implicit promise of downstream federal 
involvement. States and municipalities have sought to disentangle 
ordinary policing from immigration enforcement by declining to 
honor federal immigration detainers,214 which are the principle 
mechanism by which ICE seeks to obtain information about, or to 
request custody of, suspected immigration violators who have been 
arrested by state and local officials.215
raised by the case was that arrests for minor crimes could and would be used as 
pretexts to harass people or to investigate other crimes for which police lacked 
probable cause. The Supreme Court declined the invitation to address pretext by 
prohibiting warrantless arrests for minor crimes. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 355. In her 
dissent, Justice O’Connor worried that pretextual arrests create the risk of racial 
profiling. See id. at 363-64 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Some states have attempted to 
address the Atwater problem by defining some minor offenses as non-arrestable 
offenses. The Supreme Court has held, however, that arrests in violation of state law 
do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008). 
The Supreme Court has waded into the problem of crime definition in City of 
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 41 (1999), but the holding was based on a 
judgment that the law at issue was vague. The holding in Morales does not address 
the problems raised by clear laws that are underenforced, which was the issue in 
Atwater.
 214. DECLINED DETAINER REPORT, supra note 94, at 1 (listing nearly 300 
jurisdictions with such policies). A partially redacted copy of the report was 
obtained by the Center for Immigration Studies. 
 215. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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State resistance was triggered in large part by a dramatic rise in 
the use of detainers in the years after Secure Communities was 
launched. In fiscal year 2007—the first year of Secure Communities 
—ICE filed 15,000 detainers.216 By 2013, the number had risen to 
over 250,000 per year.217 Even more alarming to state officials was 
the issuance of more immigration detainers for persons at earlier 
stages of criminal proceedings. In addition, there were more 
detainers for minor criminal offenders than ever before.218 State 
resistance to detainers was especially vehement during a period when 
ICE appeared to treat them as demands for officials to retain custody 
of detainees beyond the end of authorized state or local custody. This 
reading raised Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering issues as well 
as Fourth Amendment concerns. While there has been some dispute 
over whether detainers constitute “orders” or “requests,” ICE has 
recently made explicit that it views detainers as requests.219
In response to the focus on minor offenders and offenders who 
had merely been arrested or charged, state and local officials began 
to use control over detainers to limit the connection between policing 
and immigration enforcement. One option adopted by a number of 
jurisdictions is to honor detainers for individuals in state or local 
custody only if the suspected illegal immigrant has been convicted of 
or charged with (not merely arrested for) a serious crime.220 This 
strategy has a two-fold purpose: The first is to decouple mere arrests 
from immigration enforcement. This discourages police from 
arresting minor offenders or individuals unlikely to be charged or 
prosecuted in order to expose them to federal immigration 
authorities. The second is to avoid facilitating the deportation of 
individuals who have been arrested for minor crimes such as traffic 
offenses but are otherwise law-abiding individuals with no criminal 
record. Importantly, this helps to dispel the perception in immigrant 
communities that any interaction with police could lead to 
deportation.  
 216. Lasch, supra note 90. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See generally MANUEL, supra note 91.  
 219. It is now settled that detainers must be deemed requests only in order to 
satisfy Tenth Amendment concerns. See cases cited infra note 234. ICE has changed 
its detainer forms to reflect this understanding. In response to Fourth Amendment 
concerns, ICE now asks states to provide notification of impending release rather 
than demanding or requesting that an individual be detained beyond the period 
authorized by state law or the terms of a criminal sentence. 
 220. See MANUEL, supra note 91, at 28. 
 The New Immigration Federalism 1255 
For example, California and Connecticut have each passed 
legislation providing that an individual who has become eligible for 
release from custody may be detained on the basis of an immigration 
hold only if the individual has been convicted of a crime contained in 
a specifically defined list of serious or violent crimes.221 New York 
City law permits compliance with ICE detainers only for an 
individual who has been convicted of specified felonies or 
misdemeanors, is a criminal defendant in a case involving specified 
felonies or misdemeanors that meet specific criteria, has an 
outstanding criminal warrant, is a known gang member, or is a match 
in the terrorist screening database.222
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department have each announced that they 
will not turn over to immigration authorities individuals arrested for 
petty crimes.223 In interdepartmental correspondence recommending 
the adoption of this policy, the Chief of the LAPD referenced a 
survey demonstrating that a significant number of ICE detainer 
requests had been issued for individuals arrested on low-level 
misdemeanor charges with no prior felony conviction or gang 
affiliation.224 The LAPD has taken the additional step of negotiating a 
287(g) agreement with ICE that explicitly delays immigration 
verification by local deputies until after the detainee has been 
convicted of the crime of arrest, a change from the normal routine of 
immigration verification at booking.225 At least sixteen other states 
and localities have adopted policies declining to honor ICE detainers 
unless the individual has been charged or convicted of a serious 
 221. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282-7282.5 (Deering 2014); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-192h (West 2014). 
 222. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-154 (2016). 
 223. Memorandum from Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police Department, to 
The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www. 
lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/121112/BPC_12-0462.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DCE-4V8X]. 
 224. See id. The Chief recommended that the LAPD decline to honor 
detainer requests for “public nuisance or low level misdemeanor crimes (e.g., drunk 
in public, vendor sales on sidewalk, unlicensed driver, etc.”). Id.
 225. See Eagly, supra note 17, at 1162. Eagly does not discuss the LAPD’s 
approach to Secure Communities immigration verification, which is also triggered at 
booking when fingerprints are taken and sent to be compared with the FBI criminal 
history database. With Secure Communities in place, state and local police might 
continue to associate traffic stops with immigration verification. 
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crime or, in some cases, multiple less serious crimes, including DUI 
but excluding other traffic offenses.226
Other jurisdictions have sought to insulate police actions from 
immigration consequences by limiting federal immigration access to 
state or local prison facilities.227 For example, a Chicago ordinance 
prohibits ICE agents from accessing local jails and detainees unless 
they are acting for legitimate law enforcement purposes not related 
to civil immigration enforcement.228 Officials at New York City’s 
Rikers Island jail complex have adopted a policy requiring ICE 
officials operating in the jail to wear uniforms, identify themselves, 
and give prisoners the option of whether to talk to them.229 A Santa 
Fe, New Mexico, jail has adopted a policy of denying ICE access to 
prisoners and prisoner lists.230
These strategies go a long way toward reducing incentives for 
pretextual policing. That detainer-limiting policies are enshrined in 
formal laws and ordinances means that police officers are likely to 
know about them and act accordingly. If police officers know that 
arrests for minor crimes no longer lead to immigration enforcement, 
they will not arrest with hidden immigration motives. Similarly, if 
only individuals who are actually convicted of crimes are subject to 
immigration enforcement, police will know they cannot use arrests 
they would not otherwise have made in order to funnel suspected 
illegal aliens into the federal enforcement system. Limiting the 
downstream immigration consequences of police actions creates 
disincentives for upstream pretextual conduct.  
C.  Pretext and Political Accountability 
The above strategies for reducing pretextual policing also 
increase political accountability.231 The more police take actions such 
as stops and arrests based on transparent law enforcement 
 226. See generally CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., STATES 
AND LOCALITIES THAT LIMIT COMPLIANCE WITH ICE DETAINER REQUESTS (Aug. 
2014), https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/anti-detainer_policies_11_21_14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B9PB-8PK8].  
 227. See generally id.
 228. See CHICAGO, IL, MUN. CODE § 2-173-042 (2013).  
 229. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, HOW ICE USES LOCAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS TO FUNNEL PEOPLE INTO THE DETENTION AND 
DEPORTATION SYSTEM (Mar. 2014), https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-
enforcement/localjusticeandice/ [https://perma.cc/669Z-WZDM]. 
 230. See id.
 231. See supra notes 221-30 and accompanying text. 
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justifications (rather than hidden immigration motivations), the more 
they are accountable to the public for those decisions. Conversely, 
when police get out of the business of direct immigration 
enforcement, federal officials must take the heat for the policies and 
shape of immigration regulation.  
Some jurisdictions have taken additional actions to force 
immigration officials to articulate their justifications for immigration 
enforcement: They have adopted policies that decline to honor ICE 
detainers unless federal officials make a showing of probable cause 
to believe the suspect has violated federal criminal immigration law. 
This forces immigration officials to make the prosecutorial decision 
and articulate the reasons why a state or local detainee should be 
held and transferred to federal custody. Some states and localities 
have gone even further, requiring not only probable cause but also a 
judicial warrant issued by a magistrate before officials will honor an 
ICE detainer.232 The benefit for political accountability of requiring a 
warrant is not so much judicial review—warrant review is ex parte 
and not extremely rigorous—but rather that it forces federal officials 
to articulate to state officials (and ultimately to the public) the federal 
immigration interests behind their detainer-hold requests. 
In addition to concerns about pretext and political 
accountability, these policies address an additional concern, namely 
that immigration holds of individuals in state or local custody may 
violate the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment requires that 
all custodial seizures be supported by probable cause of criminal 
activity. As a detainer is a request for state officials to keep an 
individual in custody for “48 hours beyond the time when he or she 
would otherwise have been released from your custody,” it is a new 
 232. They include counties surrounding Buffalo, Miami, Denver, El Paso, 
Los Angeles, and Seattle. It bears noting that the current I-247D, Immigration 
Detainer Request for Voluntary Action, includes the statement “Probable cause 
exists that the subject is a removable alien” and a series of checkboxes to explain the 
basis for that statement, including the following justifications:  
a final order of removal against the subject; the pendency of ongoing 
removal proceedings against the subject; biometric confirmation of the 
subject’s identity and a records check of federal databases that 
affirmatively indicate . . . that the subject either lacks immigration status 
or . . . is removable under U.S. immigration law; and/or statements made 
voluntarily by the subject that affirmatively indicate the subject either 
lacks immigration status . . . or is removable. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION DETAINER—REQUEST FOR 
VOLUNTARY ACTION, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/402/include/I-247D.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DH9P-7NUR] (last visited Dec. 12, 2016). 
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seizure.233 Lower courts that have considered the question have held 
that immigration holds pursuant to federal request, but without any 
showing of probable cause, violate the Fourth Amendment.234
Some lower courts have cast doubt on whether state and local 
officials can honor detainers without a judicial warrant. While Fourth 
Amendment law permits warrantless arrests based on probable cause 
for criminal activity (felonies, or misdemeanors observed by the 
officer), many federal immigration offenses are civil rather than 
criminal. (The very definition of probable cause is reason to believe 
that a crime has been committed.) It is not at all clear that state and 
local officials have the power to make warrantless arrests (or 
seizures) based on probable cause that a civil offense has been 
committed.235 Requiring probable cause and a judicial warrant 
addresses these concerns.  
D. Racial Profiling and Motivation 
Perhaps the most intractable feature of pretextual immigration 
policing is the risk of racial profiling. The most obvious strategy for 
addressing racial profiling—but also the least likely to succeed—is 
to regulate motivation directly by forbidding stops or arrests 
premised on the race of the suspect. A number of jurisdictions have 
attempted to do so. For example, the LAPD has a written policy—
“Special Order 40”—which forbids police to initiate police action for
 233. This language comes from the DHS Immigration Detainer form I-247D. 
The most recent form makes it clear that the detainer is a request, not a demand. See
id.
 234. See, e.g., Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F. Supp. 3d 791, 807-08 (N.D. Ill. 
2014); Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10-cv-06815, 2012 WL 1080020, at *9, *14 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 30, 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 745 F.3d 634 (3d. Cir. 2014); Miranda-
Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *14 (D. 
Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29 (D.R.I. 2014), 
aff’d in part, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015). See also, e.g., Cervantez v. Whitfield, 
776 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1985) (stipulation by ICE predecessor INS that a 
detainer is a warrantless arrest that must be justified by probable cause that the 
individual “to be held (a) is an alien, (b) is in the United States in violation of the 
immigration laws, and (c) is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained”). In 
2012, DHS revised the Immigration Detainer form to provide a checkbox for federal 
officials to assert that ICE had “reason to believe” that the individual was in the 
country illegally. See 2012 Memorandum, supra note 42, at 2. At least one court 
concluded that “reason to believe” was not sufficient to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment standard.  
 235. Compare supra Section I.A., with Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492, 2505 (2012). 
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the purpose of investigating suspected immigration violations.236 To 
facilitate this policy, LAPD “officers have [the] authority to cite and 
release suspects arrested for low-level crimes and accept foreign 
consulate identification cards as a legitimate form of 
identification.”237
While this policy is laudable, it is unlikely to be successful in 
addressing pretextual stops and arrests. As laid out in detail in Part 
II, police officers virtually always have a legitimate reason to stop 
any automobile by waiting until the driver commits a traffic 
offense.238 Minor street crimes and Terry stops offer the same options 
for stopping pedestrians. Thus, once police know that it is verboten 
to stop or arrest for the purpose of investigating suspected illegal 
status, they can hide any unlawful motivations by relying on an 
objectively reasonable justification for the stop or arrest.239
The best hope for decreasing the incidence of racial profiling is 
to decrease the possibility of pretextual policing in the ways 
described above rather than to regulate motivation directly. Recall 
that police are tempted to use race as a proxy for illegal presence, 
stopping and arresting foreign-looking individuals in order to funnel 
them into the immigration system. If police realize that arrests for 
minor crimes do not result in immigration enforcement, they will be 
less likely to target suspected immigrants with such arrests. This 
conclusion comports with recommendations by the Department of 
Homeland Security Task Force on Secure Communities, a broad-
based panel of experts convened to address claims that Secure 
Communities had negatively impacted policing and triggered racial 
profiling. Addressing the rise in deportation of minor offenders, the 
Task Force recommended that ICE withhold “enforcement action 
based solely on minor traffic offenses.”240 The recommendation was 
 236. See Eagly, supra note 17 at 1158; see also DARYL F. GATES, CHIEF OF 
POLICE, SPECIAL ORDER NO. 40, L.A. POLICE DEP’T 1 (Nov. 27, 1979), http://assets. 
lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/SO_40.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF74-4VYP] (“Officers shall 
not initiate police action with the objective of discovering the alien status of a 
person.”). Eagly describes the Los Angeles model as one in which “criminal justice 
actors endeavor to make decisions that limit the potential effects of immigration 
status and enforcement on criminal adjudication.” Eagly, supra note 17, at 1157. 
 237. Eagly, supra note 17 at 1158-59. 
 238. See supra Section II.C. 
 239. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1968). (recognizing and 
lamenting the difficulty of ferreting out invidious motivations for searches and 
seizures by police). 
 240. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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designed to “discourage minor arrests undertaken only to channel 
noncitizens into the ICE system, when [a] local jurisdiction has no 
real intention to expend its own prosecutorial and judicial resources 
on such a case.”241 A secondary and related purpose was to “reduce 
the risk of racial profiling or other distortions of standard arrest 
practices followed by arresting or correctional officers.”242
E. Federal Response to the New Immigration Federalism 
Federal responses to the new immigration federalism have 
taken two radically different forms. Federal immigration officials 
have adopted a largely constructive response to state and local 
resistance, taking seriously the conclusion of the Task Force on 
Secure Communities that current immigration enforcement policies 
have resulted in an “unintended negative impact” on local policing.243
The Task Force made the following observations:  
Secure Communities and other federal enforcement and removal programs 
do not operate in a vacuum. In many localities, police leaders have said 
that immigration enforcement policies are disrupting police-community 
relationships that are important to public safety and national security. . . . 
When communities perceive that police are enforcing immigration laws, 
especially if there is a perception that such enforcement is targeting minor 
offenders, th[e] trust [between police and immigrant communities] is 
broken . . . and victims, witnesses and other residents may become fearful 
of reporting crime or approaching the police to exchange information. . . . 
To the extent that Secure Communities may damage community policing, 
the result can be greater levels of crime.244
The Task Force concluded that “DHS must be willing to adjust its 
enforcement programs to minimize the risk that they will adversely 
impact local law enforcement efforts.”245
The Task Force was divided about whether these deficiencies 
were enough to require termination of Secure Communities, and ICE 
22 (2011), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-
communities-findings-and-recommendations-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/555K-
KMJJ]. The Task Force comprised “local and state law enforcement and homeland 
security officials, attorneys with expertise in immigration practice and criminal law, 
academics, social service agency leaders and others.” Id. at 4. 
 241. Id. at 22. 
 242. Id.
 243. Id. at 24. 
 244. Id.
 245. Id. at 26. 
 The New Immigration Federalism 1261 
initially defended the program.246 But as criticism continued and state 
resistance dramatically increased, ICE eventually discontinued 
Secure Communities, replacing it with the Priority Enforcement 
Program (PEP). PEP was designed to address one of the most 
significant objections to Secure Communities by reducing 
immigration enforcement against individuals arrested for minor 
offenses. Under PEP, federal officials are directed to enforce 
immigration law against illegal immigrants in state custody only if 
they have been convicted, not merely charged, unless they otherwise 
pose a danger to national security.247 They are also instructed not to 
pursue aliens convicted of traffic offenses or misdemeanors, except 
those involving DUI, drugs, firearms, domestic violence, sexual 
abuse or exploitation, or misdemeanors resulting in at least three 
months incarceration.248 These policies create disincentives for police 
to use pretextual stops and arrests to funnel suspected immigrants 
into the federal system. 
PEP also addresses other features of federal detainer policy that 
have fueled state resistance. ICE has directed immigration officials 
to issue detainers only if an alien is subject to a final order of 
removal or ICE has probable cause of removability,249 which may 
alleviate some Fourth Amendment concerns. Otherwise, officials are 
directed to seek “transfers” of suspected aliens or to request 
 246. MORTON, PROTECTING THE HOMELAND, supra note 126, 6 (arguing that 
minor offenders who were deported under Secure Communities satisfied other 
priorities). 
 247. Compare Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, to All ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6M5-FZHX] 
(permitting detainers to be issued against an individual who has been charged with a 
felony offense or charged with one of an enumerated list of misdemeanor offenses), 
with Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Security, to Thomas Winkowski, Acting Dir. of U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement 2-3 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TEW-WVBQ]
[hereinafter Policies Memorandum] (permitting a request for transfer only if the 
alien has been “convicted of an offense classified as a felony in the convicting 
jurisdiction” or the alien has been “convicted of three or more misdemeanor 
offenses”). 
 248. See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 247, at 2; Policies 
Memorandum, supra note 247, at 3-4.
 249. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. This change responds to a 
series of adverse federal court judgments holding that detentions subject to detainers 
not supported by probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Miranda-
Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Morales v. 
Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29 (D.R.I. 2014).  
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“notifications” of pending releases of aliens rather than issuing 
detainers. Even transfers are to be limited to circumstances that 
would promote specified federal immigration priorities or “when, in 
the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director, the alien otherwise 
poses a danger to national security.”250
If strictly implemented, these changes would go some distance 
toward addressing the issues that have led states to enact sanctuary 
laws. Unfortunately, many state and local jurisdictions have 
responded to federal assurances with disbelief and distrust. Quite a 
number have already opted out of the new PEP program. These 
reactions result from suspicion that ICE will be unable or unwilling 
to fulfill its asserted priorities as seems to have occurred under 
Secure Communities. Only if federal agents both publicize these 
priorities and implement them carefully over time will states find it 
unnecessary to take measures into their own hands. For now, many 
states and localities remain unconvinced and the new immigration 
federalism continues to hold sway. 
Significantly, in its FY 2015 Enforcement and Removal 
Operations Report, ICE explicitly recognized the continuing need to 
reestablish a constructive relationship with state and local partners. 
To that end, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, Deputy 
Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, and ICE Director Sarah Saldana met 
with elected officials and law enforcement personnel from some of 
the largest police jurisdictions with the result that “many law 
 250. Policies Memorandum, supra note 247, at 2. Current federal 
immigration enforcement policy, announced on the same day that PEP was 
inaugurated, describes three priority levels in descending order of importance: 
Priority 1: threats to national security, border security, and public safety; Priority 2: 
misdemeanants and new immigration violations; and Priority 3: other immigration 
violations. Id. at 3-4. Under PEP, ICE may request transfer under Priority 1(a) for 
aliens who are “engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espionage, or who otherwise 
pose a danger to national security,” 1(c) for aliens who have been “convicted of an 
offense for which an element was active participation in a criminal street gang,” 1(d) 
for aliens who have been “convicted of an offense classified as a felony in the 
convicting jurisdiction,” and 1(e) for aliens who have been “convicted of an 
‘aggravated felony’” as defined by immigration law. Id. at 3. In addition, they can 
request transfer under Priority 2(a) for aliens who have been “convicted of three or 
more misdemeanor offenses, other than traffic offenses or state or local offenses for 
which an essential element was the alien’s immigration status” and 2(b) for aliens 
who have been convicted of specified “significant misdemeanors” including, among 
other things, domestic violence, sexual abuse, firearms offenses, and drug trafficking 
or for unspecified offenses for which the individual was sentenced to time in 
custody of ninety days or more. See id. at 3-4. The first of the two memoranda 
explicitly repeals the earlier memoranda from John Morton. See id. at 2. 
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enforcement agencies, including previously uncooperative 
jurisdictions, are now cooperating with ICE through PEP.”251
The constructive response of immigration officials contrasts 
with that of some national legislators and executive officials, 
including President Trump, who have vowed to cut off federal 
funding for states and localities that have adopted so-called sanctuary 
laws.252 Such threatened national action ignores the findings and 
recommendations of the expert Task Force that was commissioned to 
study precisely these issues. It ignores the Task Force 
recommendation that DHS (and not states and localities) must 
change the way it does business. It flies in the face of ongoing efforts 
by ICE and the Department of Homeland Security to reestablish a 
cooperative, working relationship with state and local police. It 
undervalues the wisdom and experience of state and local officials 
who are on the ground with immigrant communities. It ignores that 
federal courts have judged some features of federal detainer policy to 
be illegal under federal immigration law and the United States 
Constitution. And, finally, it fails to wrestle with the likelihood that 
forcing states and localities to enforce federal immigration law 
would be unconstitutional.253
CONCLUSION: STATE RESISTANCE AS THE NEW IMMIGRATION
FEDERALISM
The first wave of immigration federalism enlisted states and 
localities in active immigration enforcement. More recently, many 
states and localities have sought to distance themselves from 
immigration policing by adopting policies that limit their cooperation 
with federal–state immigration enforcement. They have done so in 
 251. ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT FISCAL YEAR
2015, supra note 95, at 6. 
 252. See, e.g., Alan Neuhauser, Sanctuary Cities Brace for Trump 
Crackdown on Immigration, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, (Nov. 18, 2016), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2016-11-18/sanctuary-cities-brace-
for-trump-crackdown-on-immigration [https://perma.cc/X7YE-V42Q]; Jim Vertugo,
GOP Again Eyes Sanctuary Cities Ban Due to Political Tide, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
(Dec. 18, 2016), http://elections.ap.org/content/gop-again-eyes-sanctuary-cities-ban-due-
political-tide [https://perma.cc/UU32-8SVB]. 
 253. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992). See also Memorandum to Karol V. Mason, supra note 97. A 
full consideration of these anti-commandeering arguments is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  
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order to address certain negative consequences of immigration 
policing. These resistance policies are best seen as a new wave of 
immigration federalism—the rejection of one way to structure state–
federal relations around immigration for another. Seeing state and 
local resistance policies as a federalist response puts these policies 
into a different and more constructive light.  
First, state resistance to immigration enforcement cannot be 
explained away as simple intransigence or as resistance to 
immigration enforcement writ large. It is a response to enforcement 
pathologies that threaten the health of policing in local communities. 
States and localities will continue to resist as long as these 
pathologies are not addressed in some way. State resistance should 
be acknowledged as a serious attempt to solve real problems rather 
than as a movement to be condemned by ad hominem attacks and 
quashed by heavy-handed tactics. 
Second, federal immigration enforcement cannot function 
without state and local cooperation. Given that police are more 
numerous and have more routine contacts with immigrant 
communities than federal officials, some form of immigration 
policing is probably inevitable, despite the risks it poses. If so, 
federal legislators and immigration officials cannot treat immigration 
reform as if it were merely a federal concern. That state and local 
officials familiar with conditions on the ground have identified 
serious problems resulting from immigration policing and have 
implemented laws and policies designed to address these problems is 
reason to invite them to be part of the conversation and the broader 
solution.
Third, state and local officials are more likely than federal ones 
to be successful in addressing certain distortions resulting from the 
merged law enforcement/immigration enforcement system. While 
ICE has declared it will hew more closely to its stated priority of 
targeting aliens who pose a risk to public safety, the distortions this 
Article has identified result, in large part, from street-level decisions 
by police officers. This means that reform measures must come, at 
least in part, from the state and local level. That state and local 
officials and police leaders are taking action is a good sign: The most 
successful reform efforts in policing have required top-down 
leadership strong enough to counteract organizational pressures that 
push practices in the wrong direction.254
 254. See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police 
Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004). 
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Finally, the new immigration federalism offers insight about 
solutions. The resistance policies that have been adopted by states 
and localities are specifically designed to address the destructive 
features of immigration policing, namely deportation of minor 
offenders, which leads to pretextual policing, compromise of 
political accountability, racial profiling, and destruction of trust in 
immigrant communities. These policies do so directly by narrowing 
the population of detainees that state and local officials are willing to 
hold pending ICE action. They do so indirectly by decoupling stops 
and arrests for minor offenses from immigration enforcement, which 
creates disincentives for targeting foreign-looking individuals. 
Making these resistance policies public helps to dispel the perception 
in immigrant communities that police are actively involved in 
immigration enforcement. 
There are hopeful signs that the new immigration federalism 
may be having an effect on federal immigration policy. Officials at 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement have adopted new 
policies that could—if publicized and implemented consistently—
address some of the concerns raised by state and local sanctuary 
laws. Most importantly, ICE has directed its officials to enforce 
immigration law against illegal immigrants in state custody only if 
they have been convicted of (not merely arrested for) a serious crime
(not a minor crime or traffic offense) unless detainees pose a danger 
to national security. In addition, ICE has adopted new detainer 
policies that address some Fourth Amendment concerns raised by 
new federalist policies. That federal immigration officials are 
attending to the concerns of the new immigration federalism may 
bode well for the future of state–federal immigration partnerships. 
By contrast, unenlightened threats to crack down on new federalist 
jurisdictions ignores the wisdom and insight that states and localities 
offer in formulating workable immigration enforcement policies 
while preserving the health and safety of local communities.  
